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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the effectiveness of the European Union’s intelligence agencies, 
Europol and Intelligence Analysis Center (INTCEN). It looks at the existing legal 
framework in the field of intelligence, the level of cooperation between the E.U. 
agencies, and the way the European Parliament exercises its control. 
As a response to the increased level and diversity of threats against its security, 
the European Union undertook major steps forward in fostering intelligence cooperation 
among its member states. Consequently, Europol’s mandate was expanded to cover all 
serious crimes. The organization was transformed into a fully-fledged E.U. agency. 
Similarly, INTCEN was restructured to allow the agency to focus on both, external and 
internal terrorist threats to the Union. Despite these steps, the effectiveness of the 
agencies is low, due to the flaws in the legal framework, weak mandates, and 
complicated European affairs. Furthermore, the inherent challenges of multinational 
intelligence cooperation and weak democratic control of the European Parliament and 
national legislative bodies reduce Europol and INTCEN’s abilities to effectively fulfill 
their tasks. Therefore, this thesis recommends that the European Union improve the legal 
framework, provide real incentives for member states to cooperate in these bodies, and 
increase the democratic control of intelligence agencies. These steps will enhance 
Europol and INTCEN’s mandates, make them more transparent, and increase their 
effectiveness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The end of Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain opened the path towards the 
enlargement of the European Union (E.U.). Today, it comprises twenty-nine states and is 
a major player in world affairs. On the international scene, the E.U. is unique: it is more 
than an alliance; but, still less than a federal state. Also, its political, economic, and 
cultural diversity, along with the members’ desire to work closely together on economic, 
political, social, and security issues, is not matched by any other organization. This 
heterogeneous character can provide the E.U. with an advantage over the single states in 
formulating security policies, since each member country provides knowledge, expertise, 
and resources. At the same time, this diversity challenges the E.U.’s decision making 
process, due to the struggle between the members’ national and the organization’s 
interests. On the one hand, countries have an interest in cooperating to fight international 
threats; on the other hand, they strive to maintain national sovereignty and the monopoly 
of force. These issues become further complicated by the rapid and dynamic changes in 
the nature and level of threats in the new security environment. International terrorism, 
transnational organized crime, illegal immigration, energy resources scarcity, 
radicalization of politics, and deteriorating economic conditions are just few of the 
challenges that the E.U. currently  faces. In order to cope with them, the E.U. constantly 
adapts its economic and security policies. As the world becomes even more 
interconnected and threats continue to transcend national borders, the need for closer 
cooperation between states increases. 
Within this complex security environment, intelligence cooperation (both, for 
military and non-military purposes) plays a major role. Thomas C. Bruneau asserts that 
“effective intelligence agencies are the first line of defense”1 in confronting 
contemporary international threats. Although there are multiple accepted definitions of 
                                                 
1 Thomas C. Bruneau, Introduction: Challenges to Effectiveness in Intelligence due to the Need for 
Transparency and Accountability in Democracy, Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 3 (Monterey: Naval 
Postgraduate School, May 2007), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485128. 
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intelligence, Mark M. Lowenthal captures the essence of the concept. He defines 
intelligence as a “process” aimed to identify, request, collect, analyze and disseminate 
certain types of information. Also, it is the resulting “product” of the process, and it is the 
“organization” of the intelligence system.2 This definition will be used to analyze the 
European Union’s intelligence system. When analyzing intelligence, one must consider 
its effectiveness. This is a very complicated task, for two reasons: first, “effectiveness – 
except by its absence, as in intelligence failure – is all but impossible to prove;”3 second, 
there is little literature published on how to properly analyze intelligence. A very broad 
description of effectiveness may be that it represents the ability of the intelligence 
agencies to fulfill their assigned missions and tasks. Michael Herman, a British scholar 
and former intelligence officer, states that intelligence efficiency and effectiveness are 
“hard to measure” and the outcome of the process is hardly the object of a “traditional 
cost-benefit analysis.” There is no “perfect system of accountancy” that could quantify 
intelligence efficiency and effectiveness.4 Given these points, for the purpose of this 
thesis, Bruneau and Matei’s requirements for effectiveness will be used: the existence of 
a plan (e.g., national security strategy and/or intelligence doctrine); structures/institutions 
capable of implementing those  plans (e.g. NSC, MOD, Minister of Intelligence); 
sufficient resources (personnel, equipment, budget); and some interagency 
cooperation/coordination.5 These are necessary conditions, but not sufficient. 
In its quest for unity, the E.U. developed central institutions designed to 
contribute to better intelligence cooperation among its member states and increase 
situational awareness through sharing and fusion of information. The terrorist attacks in 
                                                 
2 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 8. 
Also refer to Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and 
Effectiveness,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas 
C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007), 6–7.  
3 Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and 
Effectiveness,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas 
C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007), 332. 
4 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 298–300. 
5 Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization 
and Civil-Military Relations, Democratization, 15:5 (Stanford: Institute for international Studies, 2008): 
909–929. 
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the U.S. (2001), Spain (2004), and the U.K. (2005) showed the need for increased 
effectiveness of the intelligence agencies. The E.U. responded to the dynamic security 
environment by enhancing Europol and establishing the Joint Intelligence Center 
(SitCen), in 2000, the Intelligence Directorate (INTDIR) within the E.U. Military Staff 
(EUMS), in 2001, and the Satellite Centre (EUSC), in 2002. Although their creation was 
a major step toward knitting the E.U. member states better together, the effectiveness of 
these institutions dealing with the current security challenges and threats remains in 
question. The requirement for increased intelligence effectiveness remains 
unquestionable as a consequence of the asymmetrical, unconventional, and unpredictable 
character of current threats. The E.U. needs to work continuously on improving the 
effectiveness of intelligence to guarantee the Union’s security. 
In this context, this thesis will attempt to assess the effectiveness of the E.U. 
intelligence agencies, looking at Europol and INTCEN, as the main actors. The Satellite 
Center and the Intelligence Directorate will not be analyzed in this thesis, since they are 
“technical” and departmental agencies. Specifically, the thesis will attempt to answer the 
following question: Has the European Union been able to successfully institutionalize an 
effective intelligence system, in order to respond effectively to the security threats and 
challenges of the 21st century environment? 
To answer the primary research question, the thesis addresses a second tier of 
questions:  
• Why is an increase of intelligence effectiveness in the European Union 
needed?  
• What are the challenges of intelligence effectiveness in the E.U.? 
• Can these challenges be overcome, in order for the E.U. to increase its 
intelligence effectiveness? Is there a conceptual framework aimed at 
increasing intelligence effectiveness that can be successfully applied to the 
intelligence system of the E.U.? 
• What lessons can be learned from the European Union’s intelligence 
effectiveness?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
The importance of this thesis is threefold.  
  4 
First, its information would help the European Union improve its intelligence 
effectiveness by identifying relevant issues. This could lead to an overall improvement of 
the European Union’s security. Today, the E.U. represents more than 500 million people, 
in twenty-nine countries, among them two of the five permanent member states of the 
United Nations Security Council, four member states of the Group of Eight (G-8), and 
twenty-three of twenty-nine member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). The European Union’s gross national income is around thirty percent of gross 
world income. The defense budget of the E.U. member states represents almost twenty-
five percent of world defense spending.6 Therefore, the E.U. is of major importance in 
today’s world affairs, and its steps in improving security determine outcomes which 
affect not only its member states, but also the global environment. 
Second, the E.U. is a close ally of the United States. Improving the E.U.’s 
intelligence effectiveness would be relevant to the United States, since successful 
cooperation between the two is a top priority on both sides of the Atlantic. The need for 
better cooperation in the field of intelligence gained a sense of urgency after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks against the United States. The consequent inquiry revealed that the 
terrorists used Europe as a staging area before embarking on their dreadful mission. 
Therefore, the 9/11 Commission recommended increased intelligence cooperation 
between the United States and the European Union to prevent such events from 
happening again. Also, the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) 
highlighted the fact that Europe is not secure from international threats. Consequently, 
the E.U. and U.S. acknowledged the importance of better cooperation between them, 
especially in sharing intelligence. Since then, contacts between E.U. and U.S. officials 
and agencies have increased. Ministerial level meetings between the two occur every 
year. Bi-lateral working groups develop policies to combat international threats. Also, the 
U.S. intelligence agencies (CIA, FBI, and NSA), have embedded liaison officers with 
their respective E.U. department counterparts, to provide for better intelligence sharing 
and cooperation. This cooperation has bridged many intelligence gaps in the fields of 
                                                 
6 Klaus Becher, Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 2003 European 
Security Strategy, European Security, 13:4 (London: Taylor & Francis, 2004) 345–359, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09662830490500008. 
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combating international terrorism, organized crime, and illegal immigration. 
Consequently, the answer to the major research question of this thesis will provide the 
United States with a better understanding of the E.U. intelligence system and its 
effectiveness. 
Third, as the security environment changes, the world is witnessing an increased 
desire for regional cooperation. This cooperation exceeds the regular state-to-state 
political, economic, and military exchanges. It has tended to become more formalized, 
closer to what the E.U. represents. It is in this light that the lessons learned from the 
analysis of the E.U. intelligence system’s effectiveness might present relevance to other 
organizations. 
C. OVERVIEW AND ORGANIZATION 
This thesis comprises six chapters.  
The first chapter will outline the relevance of the topic, the literature review, and 
the methodology used throughout the study. 
Chapter two will look at the E.U.’s actions towards the establishment of Europol 
and INTCEN, and provide a short history of those organizations, along with their current 
set-up, mandates, manning, resources available, and funding channels. The purpose is to 
determine whether the agencies are capable of fulfilling their missions and to provide the 
basis for the following analysis of their effectiveness. 
Chapter three will analyze the evolution of the E.U. legal framework concerning 
intelligence and assess if Europol’s and INTCEN’s current mandates allow them to 
effectively fulfill their missions. It will analyze the general framework, the agencies’ 
powers and competencies, and address their dependence on member states’ agencies. 
Chapter four will assess the level of cooperation, both between E.U. member 
states and the E.U. institutions and third party bodies. It will also identify and address the 
challenges to multinational intelligence cooperation and their effects on the E.U. 
agencies. 
  6 
Chapter five will address the issue of democratic control of Europol and INTCEN 
by the European Parliament and national legislative bodies. It will focus on guidance and 
oversight, and attempt to recognize the challenges presented in this area. 
Chapter six will identify lessons learned, building on Bruneau, Boraz, and Matei’s 
framework. In addition, the study will suggest recommendations to improve intelligence 
effectiveness in the E.U. 
D. METHODS TO ADDRESS EFFECTIVENESS 
Research for this thesis follows two approaches: a review of the existing literature 
and a case study. The literature review will address the theoretical aspects of intelligence 
and effectiveness. Also, it will outline the characteristics of the new security 
environment. The case study will analyze the effectiveness of the two main E.U. 
intelligence agencies: Europol and INTCEN. The conceptual framework used to examine 
the intelligence agencies will be “the Civil–Military Relations trinity: control – 
effectiveness – efficiency.”7 Without a proper framework, the findings of this study 
would not be relevant. Unfortunately, only two aspects of the CMR trinity will be used 
(control and effectiveness). Efficiency is almost impossible to determine, since 
intelligence agencies’ budgets are secret. Even when they do become public, they provide 
little data for a proper analysis. In particular, since the E.U.’s intelligence agencies 
receive funding both from the Union and the member states trying to assess efficiency 
becomes further complicated. On the other hand, control refers to the democratic control 
over intelligence agencies, and covers both direction (guidance) and oversight 
(monitoring). Effectiveness will be analyzed by looking at three major areas: legal 
framework (mandate, staffing, funding), cooperation (between agencies and with third-
party bodies), and democratic control (guidance and oversight). The study will attempt to 
                                                 
7 Bruneau, Thomas C. and Boraz, Steven C., “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and 
Effectiveness,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas 
C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007), 1–21. Also refer to 
Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and 
Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15:5 (Stanford: Institute for international Studies, 2008): 909–
929, and Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, Intelligence reform in new democracies: factors 
supporting or arresting progress, Democratization, 18: 3 (Stanford: Institute for international Studies, 
2011), 602–630. 
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identify whether the three major areas provide conditions for the E.U.’s intelligence 
agencies to effectively fulfill their roles and missions. Finally, the thesis will advance 
recommendations to improve effectiveness. These recommendations might work for the 
E.U. as they do for states. 
The first step in any study is to define the concepts. Bruneau observed that “the 
terms and concepts associated with intelligence are not agreed upon and ambiguous.”8 
However, there are some ways to define intelligence: (1) as a process (2) as a product, 
and (3) as organization.9 An overview of the intelligence process will help understand in 
what stages of this process the institutionalizing of the intelligence community is 
improving in effectiveness. It is generally accepted that the intelligence process has five 
steps: (1) identifying requirements (2) collection (3) processing and exploitation (4) 
analysis and production, and (5) dissemination. Lowenthal added two more steps (6) 
consumption and (7) feedback.10 He also provided some alternative ways of looking at 
the intelligence community: an organizational view, a functional view, and a budgetary 
view.11 
Although the concept of effectiveness is even harder to define, for the purpose of 
this thesis Bruneau and Matei’s requirements for effectiveness will be used: the existence 
of a plan (e.g. European security strategy, intelligence doctrine, E.U. intelligence 
collection plan); structures/institutions capable to implement that plans (e.g. Europol, 
INTCEN); sufficient resources (personnel, equipment, budget); interagency 
cooperation/coordination; and democratic control exercised by the European 
Parliament.12 
                                                 
8 Thomas Bruneau, Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies, International Journal of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2001), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600152386837. 
9 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 8. 
10 Ibid., 55. 
11 Ibid., 34. 
12 Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15:5 (Stanford: Institute for international 
Studies, 2008), 909–929. 
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E. PROBLEMS WITH E.U. INTELLIGENCE EFFECTIVENESS 
The European Union’s unique architecture, which reflects great cultural, 
economic, and political diversity, along with the dynamic changes in the new security 
environment, creates tremendous challenges in the process of developing coherent and 
effective security policies. The adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003 was a 
first step towards improving cooperation among member states on security related issues. 
It recognized the need for an “improved sharing of intelligence among member states, 
and common threat assessments as the basis for common actions.”13 Meanwhile, member 
states struggle to find a balance between the pursuit of their national interests and the 
E.U.’s interests. Their desire to share intelligence collides with the natural tendency to 
“keep it secret” to protect national interests. Also, the issue of trust among member states 
becomes very important for developing an effective E.U. intelligence system. Björn 
Müller-Wille argues that “trust is often the most important obstacle in intelligence 
cooperation” and “just as the collection of intelligence in the field by agents and 
informers is based on building confidence with their sources (human intelligence), 
exchanging intelligence products between different European agencies equally requires 
the gradual development of trusting relationships.”14 To build confidence will continue to 
take time, since the E.U. consists of twenty-nine countries with different levels of 
economic, political and social development across its territory. 
Also, effectiveness is hindered by the way the intelligence agencies are set up. In 
a study published by the E.U. Directorate-General for Internal Policies regarding the 
political oversight of the intelligence agencies, the authors argue that the E.U. 
intelligence agencies lack the “special powers” granted at the national level. None of the 
intelligence agencies has the ability to intercept communications, conduct covert 
surveillance, or use secret informants. Therefore, they are not intelligence agencies as 
                                                 
13 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels: 
European Council Documents, 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents?lang=en. 
14 Björn Müller-Wille, Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence, Intelligence and 
National Security, 21:01 (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2006), 100–128, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600568394. 
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conceptualized at the national level.15 Müller-Wille assesses that “in comparison to their 
national equivalents, E.U. agencies have ‘clipped wings.’ They do not have their own 
operational responsibilities or powers, nor do they collect any intelligence themselves. 
EU intelligence officers do not have any arms. They have no power to hold and 
interrogate anybody, tap phones and eavesdrop, or conduct clandestine operations. In 
principle, EU intelligence agencies are pure ‘desk-agencies’ that work with pen and 
paper.”16 The limitations imposed on these agencies by their given mandates, the lack of 
operational capabilities, and their heavy reliance on U.S. intelligence collection assets 
hinder their overall effectiveness. 
The way the E.U. intelligence agencies are given their budgets plays a major role 
in their effectiveness. Europol receives a big part of its funding from the E.U. budget and 
the rest from the member states. The INTCEN is partly funded by the union but a big part 
of its budget consists of member states’ contributions. The agencies’ required operational 
resources are provided by the member states; however, they remain under national 
control at all times. This determines a series of outcomes, which limits the E.U. 
intelligence agencies’ effectiveness. First, there are disputes among the member states 
over power and control of the agencies since they do not provide the same share of 
resources. Second, the intelligence agencies’ budgets and staffing are often insufficient 
for them to operate effectively. Third, since the E.U. is only partly funding some of the 
agencies, it has insufficient control over their activities. In this area, the European 
Parliament shares the oversight responsibilities with the national legislative bodies. None 
of them is fully involved in the scrutiny of the E.U. intelligence agencies. This lack of 
appropriate democratic control may create conditions for abuses by the intelligence 
                                                 
15 Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy department C: Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, Parliamentary Oversight of the Security and Intelligence Agencies in the European Union 
(Brussels: European Parliament, 2011), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/libe/2011/453207/IPOL-
LIBE_ET(2011)453207(PAR00)_EN.pdf. 
16 Müller-Wille, Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence, 110. 
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agencies. At the same time, it deprives the legislative bodies of valuable information 
about the intelligence agencies’ needs, which affects their effectiveness.17 
Given the factors mentioned above and the characteristics of the current security 
environment (organized crime, illegal immigration, international terrorism, political 
radicalization due to economic conditions, and the search for energy resources), this 
thesis hypothesizes that the effectiveness of the E.U. intelligence agencies needs to 
improve and that the problems are likely to persist unless the E.U. political institutions 
increase control and support of the intelligence agencies. 
F. THOUGHTS ON INTELLIGENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
There is a large amount of literature dedicated to the definition of intelligence. 
Lowenthal describes intelligence as a “process” aimed to identify, request, collect, 
analyze and disseminate certain types of information. Also, it is the “product” of the 
process, and the “organization” of the intelligence system.18 This definition will be used 
for the study of the E.U.’s intelligence system effectiveness. Developing the concept, 
Betts, Bruneau, Boraz, Johnson, and Lowenthal argue that the main purpose of 
intelligence is to support political decision makers and contribute to national security.19 
Bruneau and Holts identified four essential functions for intelligence: collection, analysis, 
counterintelligence, and covert action.20 Along the same lines, Betts identifies the 
                                                 
17 Müller-Wille, Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence, 114. Also, see the 
Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies in the European Union, 2011. 
18 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 8. 
Also refer to Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and 
Effectiveness,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas 
C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007), 6–7. 
19 Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 1–5. Bruneau and Boraz, “Intelligence Reform: Balancing 
Democracy and Effectiveness,” 7. The national security operations mentioned by Bruneau and Boraz range 
from domestic police operations to covert operations launched outside the country’s own borders. 
Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2–4. Loch Johnson, “Seven Sins of Strategic 
Intelligence,” in America’s Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society, ed. Loch Johnson  (New York: 
Oxford University Press 1989), 59. 
20 Bruneau and Boraz, “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness,” 7–11. Also 
refer to Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democracy (Washington, D.C: 
CQ Press, 1995), 3–4. 
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functions as “collection, correlation, analysis, and dissemination of relevant 
information.”21 
Furthermore, there is literature focusing on the relation between intelligence 
reform and democracy. Regarding this subject, there is an imbalance between the number 
of studies concentrating on the consolidated democracies and the ones dealing with 
younger democracies. 
Richard K. Betts, Robert Jervis, James Wirtz, Mark M. Lowenthal, and Loch K. 
Johnson, among others, write about intelligence in consolidated Western democracies. 
The central theme of the discussion is the “secrecy − transparency” dilemma. On one 
hand, intelligence requires secrecy in order to perform effectively; on the other hand, 
democracy requires transparency. Therefore, authors suggest that a universal solution 
cannot exist, and the balance between secrecy and transparency has to constantly adapt to 
the changing nature of threats.22 Another major theme of debate within academia is the 
need for increased intelligence effectiveness, especially in the complex environment of 
democratic societies.23 The authors mentioned above brought an immense contribution to 
understanding the relation between intelligence and human rights, rule of law, political 
control, and other democratic values. Also, there is abundant literature regarding the U.S. 
intelligence community, which focuses on the same issues. 
By contrast, the amount of literature regarding the intelligence systems in the 
younger democracies is far less, due to the fact that the subject  had been of little interest 
                                                 
21 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security, 1. 
22 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security, 1–18. Ian 
Leigh, “Intelligence and Law in the United Kingdom,” in The Oxford Handbook of National Security 
Intelligence, ed. Loch K. Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 640–655. Stuart Farson, 
“Canada’s Long Road from Model Law to Effective Political Oversight of Security and Intelligence,” in 
Who’s Watching the Spies: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability, ed. Hans Born, Loch K. 
Johnson, Ian Leigh (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 99–116. 
23 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009). 
Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007). Loch Johnson, “Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence,” in 
America’s Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society, ed. Loch Johnson (New York: Oxford 
University Press 1989). Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 2004). Richard Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform 
in the Wake of 9/11 (Lanham, MD: Bowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: 
The CIA the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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to academia. Recently, this situation has improved and the number of studies pertaining 
to consolidating or newer democracies has increased. Hans Born, Stuart Farson, Mark 
Phythian, Marina Caparini, Timothy Edmunds, Steven Boraz, Thomas C. Bruneau and 
Cristiana Matei are a few of the authors who have written  about this topic. The central 
dilemma in the newer literature remained the same (the balance between “secrecy” and 
“transparency”). Also, a large number of studies covered intelligence reform in the 
younger democracies as they transitioned from authoritarian political regimes. Bruneau 
and Matei discuss the factors which support or obstruct intelligence reform in newer 
democracies.24 The question asked by many is whether intelligence and democracy are 
even compatible. Acknowledging the complexity of the challenges for the integration of 
intelligence in a democracy, Bruneau, Boraz, and Matei argue that intelligence can be 
compatible with democracy through a trade-off between the two.25 Holt argues that, 
while the democratic pressure for transparency increases, “secrecy and democracy are 
incompatible; yet some intelligence activities are necessarily secret,” in order to be 
effective.26 Also, Bruneau, and Matei suggest that newer democracies need to invest 
resources and effort in maintaining their intelligence systems’ effectiveness.27  
In addition, there is literature which highlights E.U. steps towards the 
establishment of an intelligence system. Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, Jacob Aasland 
Ravndal, G.M. Segell, Bjork Muller-Wille, J.M. Nomikos, and R.J. Aldrich write about 
this topic. Their focus is on the historical aspect of the establishment of an E.U. 
intelligence system, the reasons for such endeavor, and the description of the tasks and 
                                                 
24 Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: 
Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress,” Democratization 18: 3 (2011), 607. 
25 Bruneau and Matei, “Intelligence Reform in the Developing Democracies: The Quest for 
Transparency and Effectiveness,” 757–771. Also refer to Bruneau and Boraz, “Intelligence Reform: 
Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness,” 1–17. Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Best Practices: 
Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and 
Effectiveness, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007), 
331–342. 
26 Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democracy, 1. 
27 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Introduction: Challenges to Effectiveness in Intelligence due to the Need for 
Transparency and Accountability in Democracy,” Strategic Insights 4:3 (2007). Also refer to, Bruneau, 
Thomas C., and Boraz, Steven C., “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness,” in 
Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and 
Steven C. Boraz (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007), 1–21. 
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missions. All authors acknowledge the creation of the intelligence agencies as a required 
step in the process of consolidating stronger political, military, and economic E.U. unity. 
In order to cope with the new internal and external security threats, the E.U. had to 
improve intelligence cooperation among its member states. Following the formulation of 
the first E.U. joint security strategy under the name of European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP), later changed into Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the 
establishment of the E.U. intelligence agencies resulted as a necessity. Björn Müller-
Wille argues that the E.U. formed its intelligence agencies in order to counter-balance the 
U.S. dominance in the field. Also, he continues by pointing out that the E.U. needed the 
intelligence system to provide for its own security and the need for heavy reliance on the 
United States.28 Segell, Müller-Wille, and Nomikos argue for a centralized approach to 
E.U. intelligence, emphasizing the necessity of transnational agencies to coordinate the 
actions of the member states’ intelligence services. Norheim and Ravndal argue that from 
the very beginning, the E.U. accepted a “mixture of intelligence, police and judicial, 
military, and other means, as integral to a comprehensive security approach.”29 Also, 
they identified three factors, which influenced the development of the central E.U. 
intelligence structures: “the configuration of participating states, mission mandates and 
bureaucracy.”30 These factors shaped the geometry of E.U. intelligence and directly 
affect its effectiveness. 
There are fewer writings about intelligence effectiveness. Most of the studies 
focus on intelligence effectiveness, in general, and on cooperation. Requirements for 
effectiveness, according to Bruneau and Matei, include: the existence of a plan (e.g., 
national security strategy, intelligence doctrine); structures/institutions capable to 
implement that plans (e.g. NSC, MOD, Minister of Intelligence.); sufficient resources 
                                                 
28 Björn Müller-Wille, EU Intelligence Co-operation. A Critical Analysis, Contemporary Security 
Policy, 23:2 (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 61–86, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713999737. 
29 Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen & Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace 
Operations? The Evolution of UN and EU Intelligence Structures, International Peacekeeping, 18:4 
(Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2011), 462, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.588391. 
30 Norheim-Martinsen & Ravndal, Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace Operations? 455. 
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(personnel, equipment, budget); and some interagency cooperation/coordination.31 
Stéphane Lefebvre identifies the need for intelligence cooperation as originating from the 
inability of a single agency to perform all tasks, the benefits of sharing the cost burden, 
and the advantages of using each country’s expertise in different areas of the field. He 
also discusses some of the factors that deter intelligence cooperation, such as: differences 
in perception of the threats, differences in national interests, the unequal distribution of 
power, legal issues, and lack of trust between states and agencies, regarding the possible 
mishandling and misuse of the shared intelligence.32 Bjork Muller-Wille looks 
specifically at the intelligence cooperation within the E.U. and asserts that the process is 
hindered by different national interests among member states, different intelligence 
capabilities, lack of adequate means to perform critical intelligence tasks (collection), and 
heavy reliance on the United States in this area.33 Other authors, such as Norheim and 
Ravndal, argue that the E.U.’s intelligence agencies address only strategic issues, but do 
not develop at the operational and tactical levels. 
The literature existing on the E.U. and its intelligence effectiveness lacks a 
conceptual framework. The studies are more like anecdotal accounts. Eric Van Um and 
Daniela Pisoiu argue that the study of effectiveness, although very important, “is plagued 
by both theoretical underdevelopment and a lack of methodological grounding.”34 This 
thesis will complement the existing general literature on intelligence effectiveness and 
E.U. intelligence effectiveness, in particular. It will also propose a conceptual framework 
to increase intelligence effectiveness, which may work for the E.U., as it works for 
individual countries and other regional cooperation initiatives. 
                                                 
31 Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15:5 (Stanford: Institute for international 
Studies, 2008), 909–929. 
32 Stéphane Lefebvre, The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation, 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 16:4 (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2011), 
534–536, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/716100467. 
33 Müller-Wille (2002): EU Intelligence Co-operation. A Critical Analysis, 61–86. 
34 Eric Van Um and Daniela Pisoiu, Effective counterterrorism: What have we learned so far? 
Economics of Security Working Paper 55 (Berlin: Economics of Security, 2011), 17. 
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II. EUROPEAN UNION’S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES: TWO 
INSTITUTIONS SHORT OF A FULL SOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union member countries exchanged intelligence well before the 
creation of an institutionalized framework. This exchange proceeded either on an 
informal, ad-hoc basis or through multi-lateral agreements. The Club of Berne (Club de 
Berne) is a perfect example of informal cooperation before the development of the E.U.’s 
institutions. It was created in the 1970s by the six original E.U. members, as an informal 
forum of their security services. The heads of the national security services met regularly 
and discussed the evolution of threats against the E.U. The later E.U. expansion allowed 
the Club to grow, and it now includes representatives of all the member states. The Club 
produced threat assessment reports which were shared with members and some of the 
European Union’s committees. Although the Club included all member states and 
produced intelligence products for the E.U., it was not an official E.U. institution. It had 
no legal mandate or legal provisions requiring participants to exchange information. 
Therefore, the E.U. identified the need to create official E.U. institutions which would 
fall under a written mandate with clear missions. 
Also, in the late 1990s, during the war in the Balkans, Europe acknowledged that 
devastating conflicts could still occur within its territory. Consequently, the E.U. decided 
to strengthen Europol and to establish INTCEN, formerly known as SITCEN, in order to 
provide the framework for increased cooperation among its members. The process, 
however, was slow, and SITCEN/INTCEN was not created until the terrorist attacks in 
Spain and the U.K., conducted by Al Qaeda in 2004 and 2005, proved that Europe was a 
target of terrorism from both domestic and international sources. This realization “served 
as major impetuses towards increased intelligence sharing [within Europol] and the 
strengthening of the INTCEN.”35 As a result, Europol and INTCEN became the 
expression of the E.U.’s institutional framework for intelligence cooperation. In the 
                                                 
35 Martin Todd, Could Europe Do Better on Pooling Intelligence? Security & Defense Agenda Round 
Table Report (Brussels, 2009). 
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context of current evolution of the security environment, their role in the development of 
the E.U.’s internal and external security policies has increased. This chapter presents the 
evolution of Europol and INTCEN, looks at their history, mandates, personnel, and 




The idea of establishing a European police force is older than the actual E,U, 
concept. In the 1980s, there were several calls from the main European countries, such as 
France, Germany, and the U.K. to increase police cooperation in order to deal with 
transnational crimes. In 1992, article K 1(9) of the Maastricht Treaty36 on the European 
Union, mentioned, for the first time, the creation of Europol as a police agency, designed 
to fight organized crime, drug trafficking, and other serious crimes. One year later, the 
first European Drug Units (EDUs) were established by the E.U., as a first attempt to 
create EUROPOL. These institutions had no powers to arrest, but supported E.U. states in 
the fight against drug trafficking. Their mandate was expanded to include terrorism, 
motor vehicle crimes, and organized crime, paving the way for an operational European 
police force. 
Article K about Europol in the Maastricht Treaty was agreed to in 1995, and 
became operational in 1998, after all member states ratified it. The convention 
established Europol’s mandate and required all member states to designate national 
liaison units with Europol. Also, the member states had to “second” at least one liaison 
officer to Europol’s headquarters, to “represent the interests of their national authorities 
and to facilitate the flow of information in both directions.”37 The convention ensured 
that all member states had an equal say in the way Europol was run and in its strategies 
by adopting a consensus-based decision-making process. 
                                                 
36 The treaty name comes from the city in Netherlands, where it was signed. 
37 Europol’s history, Europol’s web-page, 2012, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/history-
149. 
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In 1995, the E.U. expanded. This required an amendment to the Maastricht 
Treaty. Therefore, in 1997, in Amsterdam, Netherlands, the member states signed a new 
E.U. treaty. The new convention included the Schengen accords (1985 and 1990) and 
transformed them into permanent E.U, laws. The immediate effect of the Schengen 
accords was the abolition of internal borders between the member states. In order to 
ensure that criminal networks did not take advantage of the situation, member states 
included legal provisions in the convention that gave Europol a central role in 
coordinating police cooperation in the fight against organized crime, both within and 
outside E.U. borders. Also, Europol was subordinated to the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council of Ministers (the E.U. equivalent of the Ministry of Interior at the European 
countries’ national levels). 
Europol became fully operational in 1999, after all the legal and administrative 
issues were solved. Its mandate was expanded to include terrorism and child abuse. Also, 
Europol was given authority to cooperate with third states and international 
organizations. 
The E.U. expansions of 2004 and 2007 influenced Europol’s activity, too. On one 
hand, the E.U. was exposed to criminal networks, which used to operate outside its 
territories, and this posed new challenges. On the other hand, the expansion allowed 
Europol to gain valuable expertise by bringing in the law enforcement representatives 
who had fought against the crimes in their own regions. 
Finally, in 2010, the European Council changed Europol’s legal basis and 
transformed it into an E.U. agency. Europol moved its headquarters into a new building 
located in The Hague. 
2. Mandate 
Chapter 3 of the 1997 Amsterdam Convention stated Europol’s six main tasks:  
(a) to collect, store, process, analyze and exchange information and 
intelligence; (b) to notify the Member States without delay of information 
concerning them and of any connections identified between criminal 
offences; (c) to aid investigations in the Member States, in particular by 
forwarding all relevant information to the national units; (d) to ask the 
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competent authorities of the Member States concerned to initiate, conduct 
or coordinate investigations, and to suggest the setting up of joint 
investigation teams in specific cases; (e) to provide intelligence and 
analytical support to Member States in connection with major 
international events; and (f) to prepare threat assessments, strategic 
analyses and general situation reports relating to its objective, including 
organized crime threat assessments.38 
The key word of those tasks was “information.” This was reiterated in 2000 and 
2003, when member states agreed that “the core business of Europol is receiving, 
exchanging, and analyzing information and intelligence.”39 These provisions allowed 
Europol to become the “European center for intelligence exchange, development, 
analysis, cooperation and support in relation to the fight against international organized 
crime.”40 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the E.U. urged the member 
states to increase intelligence cooperation,41 and Europol’s mandate was expanded to 
include international terrorism. Its mandate then stated that Europol would have the 
authority to ask national police forces to launch investigations and cooperate with the 
FBI, Interpol, and other police organizations. Also, since criminal or terrorist 
investigations conducted in one member state proved, at times, to be related to others in 
other E.U. member states, Europol created vehicles to support criminal/terrorist 
investigations in E.U. member countries, namely the “Analytical Work Files” (AWF).42 
The AWFs are comprised of a collection of intelligence provided by the member states. 
The information is securely stored and securely disseminated to any member state for use 
in investigations.43 Currently, Europol maintains two AWFs; one focused on Islamic 
terrorism and another on all other terrorist organizations in the E.U. Moreover, a Counter 
                                                 
38 Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence 
Agencies in the European Union, 44−45. 
39 Europol’s history, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/history-149. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Council of the European Union, Conclusions Adopted by the Council, European Union Council’s 
Documents (Brussels, Justice and Home Affairs Council, 2001). 
42 Europol Information Management, Europol web-page, 
http://www.mvr.gov.mk/Uploads/Europol%20Products%20and%20Services-Booklet.pdf. 
43 Ibid. 
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Terrorist Task Force (CTTF) was established within Europol, in September 2001, after 
the terrorist attacks in the United States. Its mission was to collect and analyze relevant 
information regarding terrorist threats, and to produce a threat assessment for the E.U. 
decision-makers. Due to its limited resources, the CTTF did not produce the expected 
impact; therefore, in 2003, it was disbanded. It was only after the Madrid terrorist attacks 
in 2004, that the CTTF would be put in place again.44 
Since March 2007, Europol’s mandate has included the participation, in a support 
role, in the Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), which are temporarily-functioning teams of 
judicial and police representatives of at least two member states, responsible for 
conducting criminal investigations into specific matters. 
Acknowledging that organized crime and terrorism are threats to its security, the 
E.U. changed Europol’s legal basis in 2009, to make it a de jure E.U. agency.45 These 
changes came into effect in 2010. 
The agency’s current mandate, as stated on its web-page, is: 
Europol supports the law enforcement activities of the Member States 
mainly against illicit drug trafficking, illicit immigration networks, 
terrorism, forgery of money (counterfeiting of the euro) and other means 
of payment, trafficking in human beings (including child pornography), 
illicit vehicle trafficking and money laundering. In addition, other main 
priorities for Europol include combating crimes against persons, financial 
crime and cybercrime.46 
Also, Europol is responsible for producing two strategic intelligence products: the 
E.U. Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TESAT) and the European Organized Crime 
Threat Assessment (OCTA). The TESAT “aims to provide law enforcement officials, 
policymakers and the general public with facts and figures regarding terrorism in the EU, 
                                                 
44 Directorate General for Research, International Terrorism and European Security, Political Series 
(Brussels, European Parliament, 2003), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2003/326163/DG-4-
JOIN_ET(2003)326163_EN.pdf. 
45 Since the Maastricht treaty to 2009, the Convention was amended by three Protocols focused on 
changing Europol’s roles and responsibilities, yet none of the Protocols entered into force due to failure of 
ratification by all E.U. Member States. 
46 Europol’s mandate, Europol webpage, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/mandate-119. 
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while also seeking to identify trends in the development of this phenomenon.”47 The 
OCTA identifies and assesses emerging threats and describes the structure of organized 
crime groups, the way they operate, and the main types of crime affecting the European 
Union. The full versions of the reports are classified as “restricted,” but there are 
unclassified versions available online.48 Both reports are the basis for the E.U.’s 
organized crime and counterterrorism policies. 
3. Personnel 
Currently, Europol consists of approximately 700 personnel. Since analysis is the 
main activity, Europol employs more than 100 analysts from all member states covering 
organized crime and terrorism. Also, it has 130 liaison officers, who are seconded to 
Europol by E.U. and non-E.U. law enforcement organizations, representing more than 
thirty countries along with the remaining staff performing management, administrative, 
and technical support activities. The liaison officers participate in the development of the 
intelligence products, and also advise and liaise with their national authorities in 
establishing the Joint Investigation Teams (JITs).49 The personnel employed by Europol 
come mainly from law enforcement agencies of the member states, and also from third 
party agencies. The analysts are permanent employees of Europol, and liaison officers are 
seconded by their national agencies, for limited tours. 
4. Funding and Resources 
Prior to 2007, Europol functioned as an independent international organization 
and received its funding solely from the member states. Following the Amsterdam 
meeting, the E.U. member states concluded that the Europol Convention had to be 
replaced by a European Council decision. This meant that Europol would become an E.U. 
agency and receive its funding from the community budget, rather than from member 
states. Also, this would allow for better control of Europol by the E.U.’s central 
                                                 
47 Europol’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TESAT) (Hague, European Police Office, 2012), 
Foreword, https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europoltsat.pdf. 
48 Europol’s Organized Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) (Hague, European Police Office, 2011), 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/octa_2011_1.pdf. 
49 Europol’s web-page, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/our-people-19. 
  21 
institutions (the European Parliament). Therefore, in 2009, the E.U.’s Justice and Home 
Affairs Council adopted the decision to transform Europol into an E.U. agency, starting 
with January 1, 2010.50 Its budget comes from the E.U. budget, although member states 
still contribute to it, but in a smaller percentage than initially.51 
When it comes to resources, Europol does not have its own intelligence collection 
assets. It relies mainly on open-source intelligence and information provided by the 
member states, on a voluntary and “need to know” basis. It receives information from the 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies of the member states. They are the main 
providers as well as customers of Europol. 
C. INTCEN 
1. History 
 Initially established as the Joint Situation Center – SitCen, INTCEN is the main 
E.U. intelligence agency. Although, its origins can be traced back to the early cooperation 
of the Western European states, SitCen was officially created in 2000, by a unilateral 
decision of the High Representative, Javier Solana. This is the main reason why INTCEN 
does not have an E.U. mandate as a legal basis, or a publicly available mandate, as 
Europol does. Initially, it was comprised of seven analysts from France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, who were tasked to monitor 
open intelligence sources in order to inform the High Representative about situations 
abroad from areas in which he was interested. 
In 2001, a British diplomat, William Shapcott, became SitCen’s first director who 
played an important role in shaping the organization’s future. The following year, at the 
initiative of some E.U. members, SitCen became the place where states would exchange 
sensitive information on foreign threats and developments. Initially, the information 
sharing took place only between the seven states represented in the organization, but 
                                                 
50 Europol: new structure and mandate, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l33261_en.htm. 
51 Initially, the member states provided the operational budget and personnel salaries. Starting 2011, 
when Europol became an EU agency, the operational budget and the analysts are paid from the EU budget. 
Member states do not contribute to the operational budget anymore, but provide the salaries for the 
seconded liaison officers. 
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gradually expanded. Information exchanged related mainly to the E.U.’s external terrorist 
threats. Starting with 2004, Javier Solana expanded SitCen’s focus to internal terrorist 
threats as well. As a result, SitCen became the E.U.’s main forum for terrorism-related 
information exchange, looking at both internal and external threats. 
Following the reorganization of the E.U., and the creation of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS – the E.U.’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in 2010, SitCen 
became part of the EEAS, under the direct authority of the E.U.’s High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). In 2011, SitCen was renamed “European 
Union’s Intelligence Analysis Center” (INTCEN). Also, in 2012 INTCEN’s structure 
changed and some of its entities moved to other services within the EEAS. 
2. Mandate 
Despite the fact that its mandate is not publicly available, INTCEN’s role and 
mission can be deduced from declarations of the E.U.’s officials and from reports of the 
European institutions and Parliament. 
Initially, INTCEN’s mandate was to provide the E.U. with a crisis response 
center. In the first years, it was more “a calm newsroom with television-sets running 
CNN and computers linked to major news agencies,”52 rather than an effective crisis 
center. All information was available on open-sources and the focus was on external 
threats. The terrorist attacks from Spain and the U.K. urged the member states to call for 
increased sharing of sensitive intelligence, especially in the field of counterterrorism. 
Therefore, in 2006, INTCEN’s mandate expanded to cover both internal and external 
threats, and to allow for the collection, processing, analysis, and sharing of classified 
information. Expansions of the E.U., in 2004 and 2007, brought new members into 
INTCEN and increased its role in the E.U.’s security architecture. In 2010, INTCEN 
became part of the EEAS (not yet an official EU body), which allowed for better funding 
and legal status. 
                                                 
52 Jelle van Buuren, Secret Truth, The EU Joint Situation Centre, Eurowatch (Amsterdam, Eurowatch, 
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Referring to the current mandate, the E.U. High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, described INTCEN as the E.U.’s “single 
crisis response center.”53 Also, the Curriculum Vitae of the current INTCEN Director, 
Iikka Salmi, states: 
EU INTCEN’s mission is to provide intelligence analyses, early warning 
and situational awareness to the High Representative Catherine Ashton 
and to the European External Action Service, to the various EU decision 
making bodies in the fields of the Common Security and Foreign Policy 
and the Common Security and Defense Policy and Counter-Terrorism, as 
well as to the EU Member States. EU INTCEN does this by monitoring 
and assessing international events 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, focusing 
particularly on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats.54 
As well, the Cross-border Research Association published a report on INTCEN 
which identified its main missions: 
(1) monitors 24/7 world events and produces daily press summaries (2) 
serves as the EU main point of contact in crises management (3) prepares 
reports/analyses,55 (4) advises the EU decision makers on new CT policies 
(5) provides active communication and coordination with the EU member 
states national security (intelligence) agencies, and (6) serves as the EU 
focal point for the EU CSDP operations abroad, which includes the 
capability to initiate urgent EU responses to crises, within those missions 
(early warning system).56 
In addition, this report points out that INTCEN operates the Correspondance 
Européenne (COREU) information system (a classified network, which links the 
European Council, member states, and European Commission, in the field of foreign 
policy) and the New Communications Network (designed for the E.U. delegations 
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abroad). Also, INTCEN personnel support and accompany high E.U. officials while 
travelling, and serves as a coordination platform between member states and third parties 
during crises which involve the citizens of two or more E.U. countries. 
The 2011, a E.U. Parliamentary report regarding the oversight of the security and 
intelligence agencies noted that “INTCEN’s main role will continue to be that of serving 
as the E.U.’s information provider in crisis management situations, especially with regard 
to conflicts and the political dimension of natural disasters. INTCEN provides situation 
assessments during five phases of activity where such info is needed, which are: early 
warning, policy development, decision support, conduct of operations and mission 
evaluation.”57 Thus, INTCEN can also provide on-scene evaluation, because its members 
can be deployed to assist E.U. representatives in locations where crises emerge. During 
the Haiti and Libya crises, INTCEN had representatives on the ground to assess the 
situation and provide technical support to E.U. representatives. 
However, INTCEN   has no formal mandate to gather intelligence as traditionally 
understood. It relies mainly on open-source intelligence and information provided by the 
member states, on a voluntary and “need to know” basis. 
3. Personnel 
Prior to 2012, INTCEN consisted of three main units: 
• The Civilian Intelligence Cell (CIC), which employed civilian analysts 
working on political and terrorism assessments; 
• The General Operation Unit (GOU), which provided continuous 
operational support and non-intelligence research and analysis; 
• The Communications Unit (CU), which ran the E.U.’s Council 
communication center.58 
On March 16, 2012, the agency restructured to improve its effectiveness and 
facilitate its focus on analysis. Currently, INTCEN has two main divisions: 
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• The Analysis Division (strategic analysis based on input from the member 
states); 
• The General and External Relations Division (legal and administrative 
issues, and open source analysis).59 
Consequently, some of INTCEN’s previous functions were transferred to other 
European External Action Service (EEAS) bodies. The consular affairs and watch-
keeping area are now part of the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination 
Managing Directorate, and the Communication Center moved to the Managing 
Directorate for Resources (IT department).60 As a result, INTCEN main tasks were 
reduced to analysis and advice only. 
Currently, INTCEN has its headquarters in Brussels, located next to the EEAS 
building. It employs around seventy personnel61 that include twenty-four civilian and 
military background analysts. The analysts are seconded to INTCEN by their national 
intelligence services. Also, INTCEN employs E.U. officials, temporary agents, and 
national experts from the security and intelligence services of the member states. 
4. Funding and Resources 
Initially, INTCEN received its funding from the member countries represented in 
the organization. Starting with 2010, INTCEN has not had a separate budget, but is 
included in the one of the EEAS. Since the temporary agents and national experts are 
seconded by the member states, their salaries are the responsibility of their respective 
countries. 
The INTCEN has access to E.U. members’ satellites, such as France’s Helios and 
Pleiades, Germany’s SAR-Lupe, Italy’s Cosmo-Sky Med, and U.S.-owned commercial 
satellites. The organization also receives diplomatic reports from the E.U.’s 135 official 
delegations around the world, and classified intelligence from the E.U.’s monitoring 
missions. It is worth noting that INTCEN does not have access to personal data, as 
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Europol does. It receives finished products from the member states’ intelligence agencies, 
rather than raw intelligence. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a review of the E.U.’s main intelligence agencies, Europol 
and INTCEN. It looked at their historical evolution, mandates, personnel, and resources 
in order to identify whether their organization allows them to effectively fulfill their 
missions. 
From the preceding discussion, it can be argued that while Europol and INTCEN 
provided the member states with an institutional framework for intelligence cooperation 
and strengthened the E.U.’s internal and external security, they demonstrated certain 
infirmities, some by design and some by practice, which limit their effectiveness. For one 
thing, given the flawed E.U. legal framework in this area and their dependence on 
national agencies, Europol and INTCEN fall short of playing a coordinating role in the 
security area. They are more forums for cooperation, rather than effective and powerful 
E.U. agencies. Moreover, given the way they are funded, manned, and resourced, it is 
hard to determine to whom and to what degree they are democratically responsible. 
As both organizations were designed to be key players in the process of 
elaborating the E.U.s security policies, these infirmities have deep implications in overall 
E.U. effectiveness. Therefore, in the following chapters the defects will be addressed in 
detail. 
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III. A LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN SEARCH FOR “TEETH” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although intended to foster cooperation among member states in the fields of law 
enforcement and intelligence, Europol and INTCEN fall short of being effective E.U. 
agencies due to the flaws in designing and implementing the European legal framework. 
The political, economic, and cultural diversity of the E.U. is reflected in the way the 
member states decide to cooperate, or not, under the umbrella of these two agencies. In 
the absence of a clear and unified European vision with regard to intelligence 
cooperation, countries apply existing legal provisions according to their constitutions and 
interests, allowing for different interpretations of the same E.U. law among member 
states. Europol and INTCEN’s mandates embed and preserve these differences, as they 
grant no real powers to the agencies over the member states. The E.U. intelligence 
agencies are entirely dependent on material provided by the national-level bodies and 
their willingness to cooperate within the E.U. institutions. Furthermore, both agencies 
have responsibilities to counter the terrorist threat to the union, which, in the absence of 
clear coordinating instructions, can cause conflicting situations. Finally, the agencies’ 
mandates reflect the lack of uniformity across the E.U. in addressing intelligence and law 
enforcement cooperation. This chapter examines the potential problems arising from 
these issues, and the implications they have on Europol and INTCEN’s effectiveness. 
B. POWERS AND PROBLEMS 
Europol and INTCEN are intelligence agencies, but with serious limitations built 
into their mandates, that is, the legal basis for their work. In a study on the political 
oversight of the intelligence agencies, published by the E.U. Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies, the authors argue that Europol and INTCEN lack the “special powers” 
granted to national-level intelligence agencies—and closely guarded by national 
governments. Specifically, the E.U. agencies do not have the ability to intercept 
communications, conduct covert surveillance, or use secret informants. Therefore, they 
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are not intelligence agencies, as conceptualized at the national level.62 Müller-Wille 
assesses that  
in comparison to their national equivalents, EU agencies have ‘clipped 
wings.’ They do not have their own operational responsibilities or powers, 
nor do they collect any intelligence themselves. EU intelligence officers 
do not have any arms. They have no power to hold and interrogate 
anybody, tap phones and eavesdrop, or conduct clandestine operations. In 
principle, EU intelligence agencies are pure ‘desk-agencies’ that work 
with pen and paper.63 
During the adoption of the Europol Convention in 1991, member states agreed to 
grant Europol powers to operate across their territories.64 More than twenty years after 
this initial engagement of the member states, Europol still does not have the authority to 
operate freely across E.U. territory. It acts only upon invitation from the member states, 
when an issue involves at least two member countries; Europol cannot pursue 
independent investigations. The Director of the Europol, Rob Wainwright, expresses 
these limitations: 
as Europol officers have no direct powers of arrest, we support law 
enforcement colleagues by gathering, analyzing and disseminating 
information and coordinating operations. Our partners use the input to 
prevent, detect and investigate offences, and to track down and prosecute 
those who commit them. Europol experts and analysts take part in Joint 
Investigation Teams (JITs) which help solve criminal cases on the spot in 
EU countries.65 
Article 88 of the Lisbon Treaty also emphasizes that Europol has only a support 
role during investigations conducted by member states’ agencies. The article states that 
“any operational action by Europol must be carried out in liaison and in agreement with 
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the authorities of the member state or states, whose territory is concerned. The 
application of coercive measures shall be the exclusive responsibility of the competent 
national authorities.”66 The key words here are “liaison” and “in agreement with,” as they 
severely restrict Europol’s power to operate across E.U. territory. These limitations limit 
Europol to a simple “technical support” role provided to national level institutions. 
William Shapcott, the former INTCEN Director, states that INTCEN also has no 
operational role. Unlike Europol, it was not intended to be given such a role, and is less 
likely to receive it in the near future.67 Furthermore, while INTCEN “enjoys political 
endorsement from the [European] Council”68 because the majority of E.U. countries have 
representatives in the organization, it lacks a legal basis, “as the Council did not formally 
adopt a legal act for its establishment as an E.U. agency, nor is there a publicly available 
document with a clearly stated mandate or a similar constituting document.”69 This 
curious status is noted in the 2011 E.U. Parliament’s report regarding the oversight of the 
security and intelligence agencies, which states that “INTCEN is the least well known 
and least understood [E.U. agency],” and its “founding document and mandate has not 
been made public.”70 Despite the secrecy, INTCEN can be described as a “fusion” rather 
than a distinct intelligence agency. Indeed, INTCEN’s former director, William Shapcott, 
describes the organization as the place where “open source, military, diplomatic, and 
civilian intelligence is compiled to produce situation assessments, especially in the area 
of counter-terrorism.”71 The INTCEN analysts fuse intelligence from participating 
member states to create a more comprehensive threat picture at the E.U. level. They 
integrate new data into existing information, evaluate and analyze it to determine its 
value and trends, and disseminate their results to national intelligence agencies, which are 
the only institutions entitled to take action. The INTCEN does not collect information and 
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cannot conduct investigations, either independently or in cooperation with national 
agencies. 
The main distinction between the E.U. agencies and national level bodies is that 
the first do not produce “actionable intelligence,” which usually triggers an investigation. 
Rather, Europol and INTCEN provide strategic assessments of the threat picture and 
identify general trends. The E.U. agencies have no powers to task national level 
institutions to collect information or to launch an investigation based on their products. 
They push the information down to member states’ institutions, but the latter have total 
freedom to decide what to do about it. The Europol and INTCEN have no powers to 
enforce any of their findings in member states. Additionally, Europol and INTCEN 
officers cannot take part in any coercive measures, such as arrests or investigations. For 
example, when Europol officers are part of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT), they are 
there only to assist and provide support to national agencies. Also, Europol 
representatives fall under the provisions of the national laws of the state they operate in. 
They do not have the freedom of movement of an FBI agent for example, who 
investigates a federal offence in a U.S. state. National law enforcement organizations are 
in charge and Europol officers can only be deployed if a member state specifically 
requests them. Similarly, INTCEN’s officers deployed with the E.U.’s High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security cannot collect information or conduct 
independent investigations. Their role is to advise the E.U. official and provide technical 
support, such as secure communications. These limitations deter the agencies’ 
effectiveness and the implementation of a concerted approach to counter the threats to 
E.U. security. 
C. DEPENDENCY ON NATIONAL AGENCIES 
Europol and INTCEN provide the platforms for intelligence cooperation in the 
E.U., but they have no means to enforce it. The E.U. agencies rely entirely on national 
agencies’ willingness to share information. In the absence of legal provisions and 
incentives to foster cooperation, Europol and INTCEN have no means to require the 
member states to cooperate. This is done strictly on a voluntary basis and based on the 
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“need to know” requirement, determined by the member states, rather than the E.U. 
institutions which allows the member states to decide when and, more importantly, with 
whom to cooperate. For example, the initial seven members of INTCEN (France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom) trusted each other 
enough to allow the exchange of intelligence, which allowed them to start cooperating.72 
The key issue is trust, because intelligence cooperation involves secrets. It is likely that 
the initial founders of INTCEN will cooperate more with each other, while the newer 
members have to work to reach the required trust level. This is also captured in Europol’s 
mandate, which contains detailed restrictions on intelligence cooperation. Although, the 
following chapter addresses these restrictions in detail, it is worth noting that the E.U.’s 
legal framework grants member states absolute powers when it comes to intelligence 
sharing. 
Furthermore, national agencies send “finished” products to E.U. agencies, rather 
than raw information, which gives the European bodies little room for their analysis. This 
preserves the national agencies’ powers, since they do not want to disclose their sources 
or methods of analysis. Instead, Europol and INTCEN “compile” the national products 
into comprehensive reports, and then distribute them to E.U. decision makers and all 
member states. The E.U. agencies do not have their own collection assets; they can 
directly collect information from open sources only, including media and other publicly 
available data (Open Source Intelligence—OSINT). They can request information from 
the member states, but it is up to the national level authorities to decide to provide it or 
not. Although Europol and INTCEN have access to classified information, the fact that 
they cannot collect it themselves, nor direct the member states to provide it, seriously 
limits their effectiveness. 
Moreover, member states second officers to Europol and INTCEN. These officers 
are paid by their home states and represent the interests of their respective countries 
within the E.U. agencies, rather than representing a common European Union interest. 
Accordingly, they are accountable to their national laws. Given the variations in the 
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national legal systems and member states’ agendas, it is likely that effective cooperation 
cannot be achieved. The existing relations occur due to interpersonal relations between 
national representatives, rather than because of an institutional framework at the 
European level.73 In addition, the national representatives with the E.U. agencies may 
present loyalty issues, especially in a situation when there is a conflict of interest between 
a member state and the E.U. 
 In case of an intelligence failure, national agencies will be held accountable by 
their citizens and decision makers. No one will blame Europol or INTCEN in a situation 
where citizens’ lives might be lost due to an intelligence failure. Therefore, it is less 
likely that the national agencies will surrender any of their powers to E.U. agencies. The 
focus will continue to be on national bodies providing information to the E.U. agencies, 
and the latter acting as supporting elements, upon the request of the member states. 
D. OVERLAPPING RESPONSIBILITIES 
With the expansion of Europol’s mandate to include terrorism, it seems that 
Europol and INTCEN have overlapping responsibilities in this field. Besides the 
operational issues this overlap causes, the problem of mandates is likely to persist, since 
the E.U. is very slow to change its legal framework. For example, in 2010 when Europol 
became a fully-fledged E.U. agency, the European Commission stated that it would 
revisit the agency’s mandate in 2013.74 It is likely that any 2013 revision will not 
produce major changes in the agency’s mandate because of the complicated E.U. political 
affairs. In the current E.U. organization, Europol falls under the Council of Ministers for 
Justice and Home Affairs (the equivalent of Minster of the Interior, at the national level). 
Consequently, its focus is on the E.U.’s internal threats. The INTCEN is part of the 
European External Action Service (the E.U.’s Foreign Affairs Minister), and focuses on 
                                                 
73 Despite the differences between member states, usually when working in a multinational 
environment, the national representatives manage to put aside the “big politics’ issues” and collaborate 
effectively. This interaction is often better than the one done through the official channels. For example, 
despite the U.K.’s decision to deny Romanian citizens free access on its labor market, the Metropolitan 
police, Romanian law enforcement, and Europol officers conducted a successful operation to combat an 
organized crime group, which operated in the U.K. and Romania. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/operational-successes-127. 
74 Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence and Security Agencies, 47. 
  33 
external threats to E.U. security. In the area of counterterrorism, however, INTCEN has 
the responsibility to assess both external and internal terrorist threats. At the same time, 
Europol, as stated on its official website, is the E.U.’s agency designed to support 
member states in their fight against international crime and terrorism.75 Accordingly, 
Europol is in charge of producing the annual Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 
(TESAT), which represents the E.U.’s basis for developing counterterrorism policies. The 
INTCEN cooperates with Europol in elaborating this report,76 but it also produces 
additional reports. While, Europol is supposed to deliver support for operational concerns 
and INTCEN for strategic levels, in reality, the relationship is never that clear, and the 
E.U. politicians’ calls for deepened cooperation do not meet the same enthusiasm at the 
agencies’ levels.77 With neither organization “officially in charge” of counterterrorism 
policies, neither can coordinate nor enforce measures in this field. As stated before, the 
gap is filled by national level agencies, which are very difficult to coordinate, since there 
are twenty-nine member states, each of them having more than one national agency in 
charge of counterterrorism. 
The operational effect of the overlapping responsibilities is that both 
organizations report on the same issues. The INTCEN cooperates with Europol on 
TESAT, but releases a large number of reports on terrorism which are not the result of 
such cooperation. In turn, Europol maintains the counterterrorism cells in its task 
organization, and produces its own reports on the same threats. Technically, Europol is 
the organization in charge of producing the annual report about the terrorist threat to the 
union. At the same time, INTCEN is responsible for assessing the external and internal 
terrorist threats to the E.U. The issue is that there is little cooperation between the two 
agencies, due to bureaucratic reasons which will be further addressed in the following 
chapter. But, it is important to note that the two agencies’ reports on organized crime and 
                                                 
75 Europol, Official web-page, Mission, Vision, Values, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/mission-vision-values-145. 
76 Europol’s TESAT, 2012, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europoltsat.pdf, 5. 
77 Björn Fägersten, Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of 
Europol, Intelligence and National Security, 25:4, 2010, 500–520, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.537028. 
  34 
terrorism reflect these issues. For example, the reports have been criticized for being 
highly bureaucratized and failing to provide a clear and updated picture of the organized 
crime and terrorism in the E.U. A 2011 study on organized crime of the E.U.’s 
Directorate-General for Internal Policies  emphasized several points regarding OCTA and 
TESAT: the perpetuation of the “usual suspects” misconception (incrimination of certain 
ethnic groups or/and regions of the E.U., rather than looking inside the phenomena), the 
lack of attention dedicated to other types of organized crime (environmental, financial, 
and other low profile crimes) and terrorism (homegrown terrorism), and the lack of 
outside police and intelligence circles expertise in the reports. The evaluation concluded 
that the reports are merely a “copy-paste” result of the previous versions, with no real 
time and updated analysis of the threats in the E.U.78 
These issues, which identified that OCTA and TESAT do not reflect the dynamic 
changes in the organized crime and terrorism picture. They focus on traditional, “mafia-
type” groups (assuming that criminal and terrorist organizations exists, they have a clear 
and stable structure, and permanent internal and external links), completely ignoring 
other low-profile criminal and terrorist networks and their ever-changing nature. One can 
argue that the emphasis Europol and INTCEN have put on Islamic terrorist groups, such 
as Al-Qaeda, facilitated the recent home-grown terrorist attacks in Norway (2011) and 
France (2012), which led to the loss of life more than eighty E.U. citizens. These attacks 
showed that home-grown terrorism cannot be ignored by E.U. intelligence agencies. 
E. DIVERSITY VERSUS A UNIFIED APPROACH 
Europol and INTCEN’s mandates reflect the complicated way the legal system in 
the EU works. When it comes to compliance with E.U. laws, Gerda Faulkner, an Austrian 
scholar identifies three worlds of compliance: “a world of law observance, a world of 
domestic politics, and a world of neglect.”79 For example, while calling for better E.U. 
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integration and unified external representation, France and Germany maintain a high 
level of discrete national foreign policy which adds to their prestige and sovereignty. The 
U.K., while part of the E.U., seems to be the uncomfortable partner, because it kept its 
own currency, is not part of the Schengen area, and interprets any E.U. directive so that it 
fits its interests. 
Given these differences, the process of making and implementing policies 
designed by E.U. institutions is often problematic, and there are instances of “failed and 
outdated strategies: slow, imperfect, or even failed implementation, and unforeseen 
results.”80 A very good example of a slow and outdated strategy implementation is the 
ratifying process of the Europol Convention. Although agreed upon in 1992, and later 
amended by three protocols, the Europol Convention failed to be put into force for 
several years due to the slow ratification processes in and among member states. By the 
time it was enforced, it was already outdated and ineffective. Acknowledging these 
issues, in 2009 the European Council replaced the Europol Convention with a Council 
Decision, which speeds up the approval process, since a Decision does not go through the 
same lengthy approval and ratification process as a Convention, but enters into force 
immediately and can be more quickly amended. In the preamble of the Decision, at the 
second point, the European Council admits that “the Europol Convention has been the 
subject of a number of amendments enshrined in three protocols which have entered into 
force after a lengthy process of ratification. Consequently, replacing the Convention by a 
Decision will ease further amendments as necessary.”81 
 Effective intelligence cooperation requires a clear and standardized legal agenda 
which should enforce common procedures across the E.U. Instead, the current situation 
preserves the differences in each member state’s approach to intelligence and law 
enforcement. Article 67 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, states that 
“the Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security, and justice,” which certainly 
implies a territory governed by the same laws, rules, procedures, and protections. At the 
same time, the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) guarantees “respect 
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for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member 
States.”82 Across the E.U., there are major differences in the way member states define 
and punish criminal offences. 
The definition of “terrorism” is a good example. Following the 9/11 attacks, the 
European Council acknowledged the need to establish a common definition of terrorism, 
in order to succeed with the implementation of the European Plan of Action (Nothing can 
happen, legally speaking, until an act or omission clearly constitutes a crime, which 
makes the definitional issue a basic threshold). The extraordinary meeting of the 
European Council of September 21, 2001 undertook to provide a uniform legal 
framework, and the subsequent Framework Decision presented a common definition of 
terrorism, along with rules for legal cooperation between the member states for the 
prosecution of terrorist acts. According to Article 1 of the Framework, “each Member 
State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following offences, [to include 
terrorism] are defined according to its national law […].”83 The key phrase here is 
“defined according to Member States’ national laws.” As a result, terrorism is defined 
and prosecuted differently in each member state’s law. 
A fair amount of overlap in the basic definition of terrorism may be expected. 
However, Lord Carlile of Berriew, comparing the definition of terrorism as it is captured 
in the legislation of different countries throughout the world, points out that Austria, 
Germany, and Hungary, have no separate definition of terrorism in their national laws; 
they treat terrorism-related offences as common criminal acts (murder, arson,). In 
contrast, France, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania have very broad definitions, which 
allow for criminal activities to fall under terrorism-related offenses. Finally, the Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Estonia, and Poland have very narrow definitions of terrorism, which 
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focus more on offenses against the constitutional order of the respective state.84 Even in 
the countries that punish terrorism separately, the definition of terrorism is not uniform 
due to different national settings and the fact that not all European countries have ratified 
all the international conventions on terrorism. 
In this context, a common European plan to counter terrorism is very difficult to 
develop. Given the differences in the way member countries define and prosecute 
terrorism related offenses, effective cooperation in the field of counter terrorism is 
difficult to achieve. Moreover, the divergent definitions of terrorism beget varying 
procedural approaches to this issue. In the countries that treat terrorism as a common 
felony, counterterrorism usually falls to law enforcement, whereas in the states where 
terrorism is defined as a separate offense, it is usually the job of intelligence agencies. 
This discrepancy causes additional challenges since different organizational cultures must 
work together within and between E.U. institutions (law enforcement versus intelligence 
agencies).85 
 Europol is in charge of handling and processing personal data, while INTCEN 
works with classified information. Because exchanging intelligence involves sensitive 
information, there is a need for common procedures to protect against mishandling, 
abuse, and unintended disclosure—a universal minimum standard of data protection 
across the E.U. The existing E.U. provisions are loose and this has led the member states 
to ask for separate personal data protection, for example, when the Schengen agreement 
to establish a European area of free circulation among the signatory countries was signed. 
As a result, member states negotiated additional data protection provisions, specific only 
to the Schengen zone. To avoid having different provisions for every new agreement 
member states sign, the E.U. needs to develop and implement a minimum standard of 
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  38 
data protection, while still allowing the member states some freedom for extraordinary 
circumstances.86 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the reasons for Europol and INTCEN’s lack of 
effectiveness, looking at the existing legal framework. It found that Europol and INTCEN 
are supranational intelligence agencies with particular limitations. Their mandates grant 
them no operational powers. Since they do not collect or produce actionable intelligence, 
as do their national level counterparts, their role is limited to providing strategic 
assessments and information on general trends. In order to perform their assigned tasks, 
both agencies rely entirely on member states’ support and willingness to cooperate. 
Europol and INTCEN cannot task national agencies to collect or provide intelligence. 
They receive finished products from the national bodies, rather than raw intelligence. 
This leaves the E.U. agencies with little room for independent analysis. They disseminate 
the reports to member states, but cannot require them to launch an investigation. It is up 
to national agencies to decide what they do with the E.U.’s agencies reports. Europol and 
INTCEN are what Müller-Wille calls “pure desk offices.” This limitation is their biggest 
weakness, and can be addressed through changes in the existing legal framework which 
should allow the E.U. agencies to determine a “need to know” basis for intelligence 
cooperation. 
Furthermore, Europol and INTCEN have overlapping responsibilities in 
counterterrorism. The immediate operational effect is that they report on the same field. 
While this is not necessarily a bad thing, the lack of an E.U. coordinating body 
determines a situation in which Europol is in charge of producing the reports and 
INTCEN is responsible for providing the assessments. This problem can be fixed by 
assigning INTCEN with assessment and reporting of terrorism, while Europol can focus 
on organized crime. Besides the operational issues this overlap causes, the problem of 
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mandates is likely to persist, since the E.U. is very slow in changing its legal framework. 
The current situation preserves the diversity of approaches to intelligence cooperation, 
rather than providing a unified E.U. vision. This is likely to continue, unless the E.U. 
develops legal incentives to increase cooperation among member states. At the same 
time, the E.U. has to streamline the implementation of directives and policies, by 
providing member states with specific guidance during the process. Additionally, the 
criminal procedures need to be harmonized across the E.U., to allow for effective 
cooperation. 
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IV. INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION: A GLASS HALF−FULL 
Although the literature on international intelligence cooperation is sparse 
and largely historical there is hardly any doubt that all intelligence 
services perform some kind of liaison function. None has all the 
resources—financial, human, and technical—to be entirely self-sufficient 
in all areas. Furthermore, the transnational nature of security threats makes 
isolation an impossible option.87 
       Stéphane Lefebvre 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The dynamics and diversity of the new security environment necessitate increased 
consideration for intelligence and intelligence cooperation. In order to counter 
international and homegrown terrorism proliferation, transnational organized crime, 
refugees, illegal immigration, and even humanitarian disasters, the E.U. needs effective 
and accurate intelligence. This can be obtained through a multilateral and 
multidisciplinary approach and increased internal cooperation. Moreover, political events 
in the Middle East and North Africa, which triggered a large wave of migration and 
refugees into Europe, showed that events taking place outside of E.U. borders can have a 
major impact on Europe’s security and economic development. Therefore, the E.U. 
member states need to cooperate with each other, as well as with non-E.U. members and 
other international organizations. Given its architecture and characteristics, the E.U. 
offers the perfect platform for intelligence cooperation. Free movement within E.U. 
borders, adoption of a single currency, and opening of a single market for goods and 
capital within the union resulted in a decrease in border control and increase of the need 
to cooperate in the field of law enforcement and intelligence. Also, the adoption of the 
E.U. Common Security and Defense Policy in 2003 urged the member states to integrate 
their security capabilities, including intelligence agencies. But, the way the European 
platform is actually used does not match E.U. ambitions. The lack of a defined common 
E.U. interest, which allows for competing national agendas, combined with different 
                                                 
87 Stéphane Lefebvre, The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation, 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 4 (Summer 2010), 536. 
  42 
perceptions regarding the level and nature of threats, deter intelligence cooperation 
among the E.U. member states. Furthermore, trust, mutual benefits, enablers, and 
bureaucracy are all factors which affect the interaction between intelligence agencies. 
This chapter will address these issues and identify the current status of European 
intelligence cooperation. 
B. CHALLENGES FOR INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE E.U. 
Effective intelligence cooperation is difficult to achieve due to a host of 
challenges. Even at the national level, where agencies work for a single state’s interest, 
intelligence cooperation is a complicated process.88 At the E.U. level, there is further 
complication as the intelligence agencies have to represent the interests of twenty-nine 
different member countries. The lack of common interest, coordination, capabilities, and 
trust, along with bureaucratic resistance and improper balance between costs and benefits 
for member states are factors that prevent effective intelligence cooperation. 
1. Lack of Common Interest  
Lefebvre describes common interest as “a common enemy and great gains of 
sharing,”89 and asserts that, if these are missing, the states will normally refrain from 
cooperating. Also, James Walsh argues that states will cooperate in the field of 
intelligence when they have a common interest and possible gains.90 Although, some of 
the E.U.’s twenty-nine member states surrendered parts of their sovereignty to the E.U., 
by adopting the Euro currency, security, intelligence still remains a national 
responsibility. Therefore, it is hard for the E.U. to define and achieve and maintain a 
common interest across its territory. 
In this context, although the E.U. has a Foreign Policy and Security 
representative, who is supposed to represent the organization’s interests abroad, each 
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member state preserves the right to pursue its own foreign policy goals. The current E.U. 
picture looks more like a conglomerate of competing interests, rather than a common one. 
Also, since the perceived level of threat is different among the member states, there are 
difficulties in establishing a common sense of urgency when it comes to security. For 
example, the terrorist threat is perceived higher in Denmark (55%), UK (47%), and 
Germany (34%), than it is in Romania (14%), Bulgaria (4%), or Hungary (5%),91 
countries which have economic and social issues of concern. As a result, the member 
states’ priorities differ. These competing agendas did not prevent the most recent terrorist 
attack in Bulgaria (July 18, 2012). It showed that no E.U. member is safe from 
international terrorism, and can become directly or indirectly a target. Also, it highlighted 
the need for closer intelligence cooperation between E.U. members. 
Given these factors, the current emphasis remains on member states’ sovereignty 
and freedom to pursue their own national interests, rather than a common E.U. goal. This 
emphasis often allows for cooperation to happen outside the E.U. framework. The 
existing bilateral or multilateral agreements between member states are the main drivers 
of intelligence cooperation. They existed before the creation of the E.U. and are likely to 
remain in place. Given the complex geography of the E.U., the regional and sub-regional 
cooperation initiatives are better suited to solving intelligence cooperation needs since 
they address concrete, similar, and immediate regional threats which can be defined as 
regional common interests. It is obvious that states that share borders will have more 
reasons to cooperate with each other for mutual gains rather than cooperating with states 
from a different region of the union. Historical ties, similar cultures, and diplomatic 
relations are just few of the elements that will favor common interest and result in an 
increase in regional intelligence cooperation. While this cooperation is very valuable for 
particular member states, it falls outside the E.U. institutions. The resulting products of 
such cooperation might or might not be shared with all the E.U. members which, in the 
case of “no sharing,” will deprive the union of important information and may distort an 
overall E.U. security picture. 
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2. Lack of an E.U. Intelligence Coordinating Body 
Intelligence cooperation, especially when it involves the exchange of sensitive 
information, requires an agreement between participating actors. Therefore, the fear of 
breaking that agreement or not handling the information properly is always present. A 
way to mitigate these fears is to have an organization or a country in charge of managing 
the flow of information. This requires that authority to enforce the agreement and 
penalize the ones who violate it. In this case, the organization or country responsible can 
be held accountable for the outcomes of the cooperation progress.92 In the case of the 
E.U., Europol and INTCEN do not have any operational role or power to enforce any 
issue regarding security with member states. The E.U. agencies completely rely on 
national agencies’ willingness to share information, and in the absence of legal provisions 
to enforce cooperation, they have no means to require the member states to share 
information. Also, none of the E.U. agencies is officially “in charge” of a particular threat 
or set of threats which would allow for better expertise in one area. Having common 
responsibilities, especially in the field of counterterrorism, requires that agencies 
cooperate with each other. Apart from the provisions that they must cooperate to produce 
the annual assessments reports, E.U. legislation does not contain any “teeth” to enhance 
cooperation, either between the E.U. agencies, or member states’ agencies. 
Formally, Europol’s mandate has detailed restrictions on cooperation. These 
restrictions refer to the way Europol’s products can be shared and accessed by member 
states other than the ones directly involved in providing that product. All member states 
have access to the “general nature” reports and products. But, if the product concerns 
several members only, they are the only ones that can access it, along with those they 
invite to. Also, if one of the member states requires a certain product, the country which 
produced the initial information can object, and the E.U. legislation requires consensus 
for sharing. In this case, the country that produced the information has veto power over 
other members, and there are no legal bases to prevent it from exercising this power. The 
countries involved in the development of an intelligence product are the only ones 
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responsible for assessing its sensitivity and level of classification. The product cannot be 
shared without the agreement of all the involved countries. Also, any member states 
which participate in the analysis cannot share the product without the approval of the 
ones initially concerned. Although, the E.U. agencies are supposed to facilitate 
cooperation, and offer the member states equal opportunities to participate in the analysis 
process, the way the legal basis is written favors cooperation outside of the E.U. 
Allowing the states which produce an intelligence report to keep the right of denying 
access to any other member weakens E.U. institutions. The member states are the 
ultimate sovereigns when it comes to cooperation. They establish who, when, and how 
much access any other state has to the information shared. The E.U. agencies have no 
legal power to require a member state to share information with other members.93 
When evaluating E.U. agencies, Bjorn Müller-Wille94 compares them with  those 
in the  U.S. and argues “that in no sense does Europol [and INTCEN] have a coordinating 
role comparable to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.”95 He notes that 
differences appear due to three factors: first, the European geographical picture is 
different from the U.S. one. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has to 
coordinate “national” level activities, while the E.U. agencies work with multiple 
countries and national agencies. The European national agencies operate within their 
country’s boundaries. Also, required cooperation with other agencies is often carried out 
at the national level through bilateral or multilateral agreements. The European states do 
not need the E.U. agencies to coordinate joint operations since this already takes place 
through other local or regional initiatives. Second, the national agencies are the ones that 
will be responsible to their public’s opinion for any failure in combatting organized crime 
and terrorism. Although, an operation can be coordinated by E.U. agencies, still, the 
national agencies are in charge of providing good intelligence. Given this aspect, national 
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intelligence agencies will not hand over their responsibilities to Europol or INTCEN. 
Rather, they will engage in informal settings for intelligence cooperation, such as The 
Club of Berne (Club de Berne), Budapest Club, and Eursint Forum. As these are not 
formal E.U. institutions, there is no legal framework regarding their status, nor any 
requirement to share their products with all member countries. In the absence of an 
official coordinating body, member states will continue to resort to informal ways of 
cooperation. While the products of this cooperation increase intelligence effectiveness, 
they cannot be enforced throughout the E.U. This creates intelligence gaps at the E.U. 
level, which obviously can impact E.U. security. 
Furthermore, as mentioned before, Europol’s liaison officers and INTCEN’s 
analysts are expected to facilitate cooperation and exchange of information, in 
accordance with their national laws. Since they are paid by their countries, and not by the 
E.U., and complete a limited tour as representatives of their national police/intelligence 
organizations96 with the E.U. agencies, they are accountable only to their own national 
laws. In the absence of clear and unified guidance from the E.U., intelligence cooperation 
becomes difficult since member states have different national legal provisions regarding 
the processing and exchange of information. 
3. Bureaucratic Resistance 
Björn Fägersten identifies bureaucratic resistance as a major factor which prevents 
effective intelligence cooperation. The resistance comes from two reasons -different 
bureaucratic interests and different cultures. Bureaucratic interests translate into 
organizations’ desires to maintain full control of the intelligence they produce in order to 
gain power. This is a rational approach used to pursue their own objectives, such as 
increased budgets and influence. As a result, the agencies will resist cooperation, because 
it is not in their self-interests. In the case of Europol and INTCEN, E.U. politicians’ calls 
for increased intelligence cooperation have not been met with the same enthusiasm by the 
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two agencies.97 The exchange of information between the two agencies has consisted 
only of the required information for the two major reports that Europol puts out every 
year, Organized Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) and Terrorism Situation and Trend 
Report (TESAT). 
Equally important is the challenge to cooperation due to bureaucratic culture. 
Intelligence agencies are very conservative and resist cooperating due to inherent secrecy 
involved in intelligence work. To begin with, in some cases, it is the legal framework 
pertaining to intelligence that may restrict cooperation. Also, the exchange of information 
between agencies and states involves approvals; the higher the classification of 
information, the higher the level of approval required. As a result, often the intelligence 
agencies will “over classify” intelligence, to make it harder to disclose. In the  
Europol/INTCEN case, current E.U. legislation does not contain any punishment for not 
sharing, yet lacks the required incentives to increase intelligence cooperation. On the 
other hand, since the classification of the product is the unilateral responsibility of the 
originating body, there is no legal way for the E.U. to argue about this issue. For that 
reason, it is safer for an analyst, agency, or member state to over classify information in 
order to restrict access to it rather than share classified products which might be 
mismanaged by the receiving bodies. In addition, intelligence agencies attempt to limit 
contact with other organizations, for fear of leaks or mishandling of the intelligence. For 
example, both INTCEN and Europol cooperate with their national counterparts with 
which they have trusted relations and are reluctant (especially INTCEN) to share 
intelligence with other bodies. 
Related to the cultural aspect, the fact that different agencies have different 
responsibilities (e.g., police/law enforcement versus intelligence organizations) is also 
challenging, because this, too, can hinder sharing and cooperation. For example, 
counterterrorism is a law enforcement responsibility in some countries (U.K., Germany) 
and an intelligence agencies’ one in others (France, Romania). This creates difficulties in 
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cooperation, since the issue is addressed in different ways. This manifests at the E.U. 
level, too, where Europol consists mainly of law enforcement and INTCEN of 
intelligence and military background officers. Björn Fägersten argues that INTCEN 
considers itself a superior organization and, at least in the field of counter-terrorism, the 
organization “in charge”; therefore, it does not see the need to share information with 
Europol and the existing E.U. legal framework does not force it to do so. Therefore, 
Europol cooperates mainly with law enforcement agencies from member and third party 
states, and INTCEN with intelligence and military agencies, especially the E.U. Military 
Staff in the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC).98 The only required 
cooperation between the two agencies is to produce the annual reports on organized 
crime and terrorism. Organized Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA)99 is produced by 
Europol, in cooperation with national law enforcement agencies. The Terrorism Situation 
and Trend Report (TESAT)100 is put out by Europol, but INTCEN plays a major role in 
vetting it. The critics of the reports (to include here, the E.U. institutions in charge of 
supervising E.U. law enforcement and intelligence agencies – Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies and the European Parliament Supervising Commissions and 
Committees) argue that the reports are highly bureaucratized and fail to provide a clear 
and updated picture of organized crime and terrorism in the E.U. 
A 2011 study on organized crime by the E.U.’s Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies emphasizes that both reports lack the expertise of outside police and intelligence 
circles. The reports reflect the products of the specialized (organized crime and terrorism) 
police and intelligence agencies, whereas, the complex process of combatting organized 
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crime and terrorism involves other agencies (regular police, NGOs, and civil society).101 
As a result, the reports carry with them the bureaucratic cultures of the issuing 
organizations which hinder providing a comprehensive approach of the threats against the 
E.U. 
4. Limited Capabilities and Resources 
No state has all the necessary intelligence capabilities to be entirely self-
sufficient.102 Therefore, intelligence cooperation is required to provide for better security. 
Each of the twenty-nine E.U. member states brings something to the table. The powerful 
countries (France, Germany, and the U.K.) have the technical means to collect 
intelligence (satellites, SIGINT platforms, UAVs). The smaller states (Croatia, Hungary, 
and Romania) have excellent HUMINT and analytic skills. The sum of these 
competences provides the E.U. with a powerful intelligence capability. The only problem 
is that these resources are nationally owned. The E.U. intelligence agencies do not have 
their own assets and capabilities. They rely solely on what the member states agree to 
provide. Currently, the decision to share a capability is made at the national level, and the 
E.U. has no legal mechanism in place to enforce the use of resources. Although, 
reorganizing Europol as an E.U. agency was a major step forward in decreasing the 
agency’s reliance only on national members’ contributions, the organization is still 
dependent on individual countries to provide intelligence. 
Another factor affecting intelligence cooperation is the relationship between the 
amount of resources a country contributes and its desire to control the outcome of such 
resources. Although, all member states benefit from the products Europol and INTCEN 
put out, the ones that contribute more have a tendency to influence the way the 
cooperation happens. The seven initial members of INTCEN are more likely to be in the 
position to have more influence on the terrorist threat picture in the E.U. and the resulting 
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counterterrorism policies. Also, they tend to favor cooperation with the states that provide 
equal resources, and limit the access to information for the states that contribute less. 
5. Gains 
Gains are important drivers of intelligence cooperation. States will enter 
cooperation agreements only if they benefit from them. While the E.U. intelligence 
agencies provide the opportunities for increased intelligence cooperation, the benefits the 
member states get from this cooperation do not provide incentives for further 
engagement. Since the intelligence produced by the E.U. agencies does not add much 
value to what national agencies provide, the member states see no major benefits in 
formally cooperating through European Union channels. Probably the biggest weakness 
of the E.U. agencies is their reliance on national intelligence and police organizations. 
The national agencies are the main “providers and customers”103 of intelligence products. 
This means that Europol and INTCEN’s products come from the member states and 
return to them. They complement, but do not replace the reports produced by the national 
agencies. Therefore, the member states seem to feel that the E.U. agencies do not add 
much value to their products, and will refrain from cooperation. The emphasis in the E.U. 
intelligence system falls on national level agencies, rather than the central E.U. ones. As a 
result, the role of national intelligence will likely remain as prevalent as it is today, with 
the E.U. agencies working to augment those national products. 
It is worth noting that some E.U. members have strategic partnerships with the 
United States. The United Kingdom, Germany, and even newer members like Poland and 
Romania have bilateral agreements with the United States and share intelligence, usually 
outside the E.U. agencies. The revelations of secret CIA prisons in Romania and Poland 
are good examples of such cooperation. Romania and Poland greatly benefit from their 
relationship with the United States, especially in the military and intelligence areas. In a 
situation where United States and E.U.’s interests collide, it is less likely that these 
countries will give up their arrangements with United States, in favor of the latter, unless 
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the E.U. would provide them with the same benefits (money, resources, and influence) 
the U.S. currently does. 
6. Limited Trust 
Björn Müller-Wille argues that “trust is often the most important obstacle in 
intelligence cooperation” and “just as the collection of intelligence in the field by agents 
and informers is based on building confidence with their sources (human intelligence), 
exchanging intelligence products between different European agencies equally requires 
the gradual development of trusting relationships.”104 The different levels of economic, 
political, and social development across the European Union affect trust of the E.U. 
agencies and between member states. The founding members of the Union trust each 
other more than they trust the newcomers since they have developed solid relationships. 
Jelle van Buuren states that these “privileged member states” have a greater influence 
than newer members on building the threat picture and developing the Union’s security 
policies.105 The recent political and social evolutions in Greece, Hungary, and Romania 
show that the relationship between the “older” and “newer” members of the Union still  
must develop before it reaches the required level of trust. Issues such as corruption, 
political and economic instability, radicalization, and weak judicial systems in the newer 
E.U. countries add to the difficulty of establishing trust between all the member states. 
Furthermore, the initial seven members of INTCEN trusted each other enough to 
exchange classified information. As the union expanded, new members joined the 
organization, but the process of information sharing was slow, due to the required time to 
build trust. Even today, not all the member states have representatives in the agency, 
although all of them benefit from its products. 
Also, trust between agencies plays an important role when national interests are at 
stake. In this instance, member states’ intelligence bodies (either police or intelligence) 
may refuse to provide information to the European institutions if it pertains to national 
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interests, an on-going investigation, or security of individuals. The individual intelligence 
organizations may prefer to use the existing exchange channels, regulated by bilateral or 
multilateral agreements with trusted agencies, rather than Europol or INTCEN.106 
Operational intelligence cooperation, which involves personal data, requires a great deal 
of trust between the acting agencies. Since trust is not present in the overall European 
picture, the information exchanged between member states and E.U. agencies is mainly 
open-source and non-operational. The national agencies reserve the right to preserve 
operational intelligence and enter cooperation agreements only with trusted partners. 
The lack of trust is reflected in different levels of external cooperation, as well. 
The E.U. agencies share information with non-E.U. members and third party bodies. The 
Europol Director has the mandate to initiate strategic and operational cooperation with 
external bodies.107 Also, due to its external focus, INTCEN cooperates with other non-
E.U. agencies. Since both organizations are still young entities, they do not have the same 
relations with external actors the member states have. Often, the external organizations 
cooperate with trusted national level agencies, with which they have agreements and 
treaties and long standing relations. The United States will prefer sharing intelligence 
with the U.K., since they have a long-standing trusted relationship, rather than with the 
newer E.U. agencies. Frequently, the results of this external cooperation remain outside 
the E.U. There is no legal mechanism in place to require a member state share with the 
others. 
Moreover, the way the E.U. intelligence agencies were set-up plays an important 
role in intelligence cooperation. They were created from the top-down, by the European 
decision makers, and imposed on national agencies. This caused an unenthusiastic 
reaction from the member states’ organizations which saw their positions of power 
threatened by the new agencies. Therefore, the national agencies met the E.U. 
intelligence bodies with a reluctance to share information. Building trust among member 
states and European agencies requires time. Since the E.U. is a young body, compared 
                                                 
106 Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Parliamentary Oversight of the Security and Intelligence 
Agencies, 46. 
107 Europol’s website, facts, #99, https://www.europol.europa.eu/faq#n99. 
  53 
with the nation states and their institutions, it will take time for trust to develop. The more 
member states are able to interact the further they will trust each other. 
C. CONCLUSION 
None of the above challenges must be treated in isolation. They are interrelated 
and have to be addressed in relation to the others, to provide for a better understanding of 
European Union intelligence cooperation. Given these issues, the conclusion is that the 
current European intelligence cooperation level is not as high as was the E.U. officials’ 
ambition. The frequent calls for increased cooperation addressed by the politicians did 
not meet the same enthusiasm at the intelligence agencies’ levels. The current emphasis 
remains on member states’ sovereignty and freedom to pursue their own national 
interests, rather than on a common E.U. goal. This favors cooperation outside of the E.U. 
framework, through multilateral agreements. Its character is mainly informal and there is 
no mechanism in place to compel the member states to cooperate, either with each other, 
or with other bodies, through the E.U. agencies. The way the current legal mandates are 
written for the E.U. intelligence agencies does not enhance cooperation. Even when the 
states decide to cooperate within the E.U. agencies’ framework, they have the freedom to 
choose with whom to cooperate and if the final product will be shared within the E.U. 
Having no power to enforce cooperation, the E.U. agencies are weak and often deprived 
of information exchanged between states through their national agreements. Furthermore, 
bureaucracy and lack of capabilities and trust between member states and agencies, add 
to the difficulties in European intelligence cooperation. The immediate effect of this lack 
of cooperation is represented by intelligence gaps which may allow threats to build up 
undetected. Also, these gaps could be easily exploited by organized crime and terrorist 
groups and, ultimately, lead to loss of lives of E.U. citizens. 
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V. DEMOCRATIC CONTROL: SECRECY VERSUS 
TRANSPARENCY DILEMMA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The exercise of democratic control ensures that intelligence agencies are 
accountable to the people through their elected representatives. This requires that the 
intelligence bodies be “transparent.” Yet, intelligence agencies need “secrecy” to be able 
to operate effectively. Too much secrecy may lead to abuses by the intelligence agencies, 
while too much transparency can render them ineffective. Therefore, achieving the proper 
balance between the two is a constant struggle for democracies. Even though there is no 
“one-size-fits-all” solution for this dilemma, Bruneau, Boraz, and Matei argue that 
intelligence can be compatible with democracy through a trade-off between the two.108 
This process requires that the balance continuously adapt to the dynamic changes in the 
nature of security threats.109 Consequently, Holt states, some intelligence functions have 
to remain secret, to allow for effectiveness.110 
If the above dilemma constitutes a challenge for nation states, the situation 
becomes further complicated when looking at the E.U. The Treaty on Functioning of the 
European Union gives the European Parliament and national legislatures an explicit 
mandate to oversee Europol and other E.U. agencies.111 The European Parliament needs 
to oversee the intelligence agencies. First, it is a co-legislator for intelligence related 
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issues; therefore, it has to ensure that the agencies do not misuse their powers and that 
they comply with the legal framework. Second, since the E.U. provides the budget for 
Europol and INTCEN, the European Parliament has to be sure that the money is spent 
correctly and efficiently. Third, overseeing the intelligence agencies ensures they have 
adequate resources and support to perform their tasks effectively. Also, the national 
legislatures need to exercise oversight of the E.U. agencies because they provide parts of 
the funding and seconded personnel in accordance with their national laws. This shared 
responsibility creates conflicting situations and gaps in the oversight process that affect 
the intelligence agencies’ effectiveness and the overall security of the E.U. 
As a result, a current assessment of the parliamentary oversight of Europol and 
INTCEN is necessary. This will allow identifying what means are available to the 
European and national legislatures to exercise democratic control of E.U. intelligence 
agencies. More importantly, it will identify any flaws in the process which need to be 
addressed. Acknowledging that democratic control entails a wide range of oversight areas 
(executive, internal, judicial, and financial), this chapter will focus on parliamentary 
oversight only as one key factor in increasing transparency and improving effectiveness. 
B. PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT 
Parliamentary oversight can be regarded as the most democratic method of 
oversight. It is performed by representatives directly elected by the people. A wide 
representation in the oversight committees, either from all political parties (in the case of 
national parliaments) or all member states (in the case of the E.U.), ensures that oversight 
serves the general interest, rather than the interests of a particular political party or 
member state. Furthermore, legislative bodies have all the required capabilities to 
guarantee the effectiveness of the oversight process. Through their budgetary and 
legislation amending powers, parliaments can make sure that the findings and 
recommendations of the oversight bodies are taken into consideration by the intelligence 
agencies. At the same time, parliamentary oversight has weaknesses, too. Often, the 
members of the oversight committees are part of more than one parliamentary body, 
which entails their splitting their time between different areas. This diminishes the 
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oversight’s effectiveness due to the lack of sufficient time and focus dedicated by the 
parliament to scrutinize the intelligence agencies’ work. Equally important is that 
members of the legislative oversight committees may change with every election cycle. 
The intelligence agencies employ specific methods and procedures in their work which 
are not familiar to people outside of intelligence circles. Therefore, it is likely that 
members of the oversight committees, unless supported by expert staff, will lack the 
knowledge to properly understand the work of the agencies. In addition, oversight of the 
intelligence bodies requires access to classified information. This is often the most 
contested issue in the oversight process. On one hand, the intelligence agencies will 
attempt to refrain from disclosing information to protect their methods and from the fear 
of the mishandling of information by the receivers. On the other hand, the members of 
the oversight committees will demand access to information in order to fulfill their 
missions. In addition, the process of sharing sensitive information is highly regulated and 
follows complicated procedures. For example, at the E.U. level, there are conflicting 
legal provisions with regard to access to information. The general rule states that all 
documents of the E.U. institutions must be available for the public, but this is overruled 
by the provisions that allow the intelligence agencies to protect sensitive information, if 
disclosure will jeopardize the union’s security. Furthermore, the legislation states that the 
entity seeking access to a document require approval of the document’s emitting body. 
Given the supranational nature of the E.U., and the complex structure of Europol and 
INTCEN, comprised of E.U. staff and national seconded representatives, European 
parliamentary oversight of these agencies is a complicated task. Both, national 
parliaments and the European Parliament (E.P.) are to provide oversight. Acknowledging 
that there are no legal provisions (agreements) in place to regulate the access of the 
national parliaments and E.P. EP to the documents of the E.U. intelligence agencies, the 
following sections will describe the status of the oversight process, within the E.U.112 
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1. The Role of National Parliaments 
The E.U.’s legal framework assigns national parliaments an important role in the 
European construct. The general provision states that they have to cooperate with the E.P. 
in all aspects, to ensure proper functioning of the E.U. National legislatures provide input 
on legislative initiatives, receive E.P.’s reports, and participate in inter-parliamentary 
commissions, on different issues, including E.U.’s security.113 
 With regard to the supervision of the E.U. intelligence agencies, articles 85 and 
88 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) state that national 
legislatures have a key role in this area, too. Both Europol and INTCEN consist of a 
mixture of E.U. staff and seconded personnel from the member states. As a result, the 
European Parliament has to cooperate with national legislatures in providing oversight of 
these agencies. The involvement of national parliaments derives mainly from the fact that 
seconded personnel are paid by the member states, and operate in the E.U. agencies in 
accordance with their individual national laws. Given this aspect, the oversight of their 
activities is better suited for the national constituencies and independent bodies, rather 
than the E.P. In this area, member states’ parliaments have the sovereign right to decide 
when and how they supervise the E.U. agencies. There are three levels of national 
parliamentary oversight of E.U. agencies: “holding national governments accountable for 
their actions concerning E.U. bodies, direct engagement with E.U. bodies, and 
participating in inter-parliamentary cooperation concerning E.U. bodies.”114 Across these 
levels of oversight, national parliaments participate in the E.U.’s decision making process 
by providing input on legal initiatives and ensuring that the work of national 
representatives in the E.U. agencies remains within the existing legal framework. Since 
all of this oversight falls under specific national laws of each member state, there is no 
uniformity across the E.U. regarding the involvement of national parliaments in the 
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oversight of E.U. agencies. Some parliaments are actively involved in this area, such as 
the U.K.’s House of Lords and the Dutch Parliament, while others do not manifest the 
same interest. Even when it exists, oversight is done on an ad hoc basis, rather than 
following a specific methodology with indicators of performance. Furthermore, national 
constituencies focus on overseeing Europol. The U.K.’s House of Lords scrutinizes 
Europol’s handling and processing of personal data, visits the premises, and invites  the 
director to participate in House sessions.115 Other E.U. members, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
the Czech Republic, invite their national representatives with Europol to participate in the 
specialized parliamentary committee’s meetings.116 On the other hand, INTCEN has not 
received the same attention from the member states. This is mainly because it consists of 
personnel from the member states’ intelligence agencies which tend to be more secretive 
and enjoy more freedom of maneuvering than the law enforcement agencies. Also, 
INTCEN does not handle or process personal data; therefore, the risk of human rights 
violations is less than in the case of Europol. 
Until 2010, the most important oversight tool for national constituencies was the 
“power of the purse,” since member states provided the budget for the E.U.’s intelligence 
agencies. After Europol and INTCEN became E.U. agencies and their budgets came 
mainly from the E.U., national parliaments’ budgetary powers over E.U. agencies 
diminished. But, in the context of the recent “push” for strengthening cooperation in the 
E.U., the national parliaments’ role in overseeing the E.U. agencies still remains relevant. 
2. The Role of the European Parliament 
The European Parliament is the legislative body of the E.U. It consists of elected 
officials from all member states. Since oversight’s main purpose is to ensure that the 
intelligence agencies are accountable to the people through their elected officials, the E.P. 
is the E.U.’s institution which fulfills this task. To provide oversight of the intelligence 
agencies, the .E.P. has a wide array of tools and mechanisms available. It can call the 
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directors of the agencies to appear before the E.P., conduct informal meetings with the 
agencies, exercise its budgetary powers, and employ permanent or temporary 
parliamentary committees and specialized bodies to oversee certain aspects of the 
agencies’ activities.117 
a. Call for the Directors 
Calling for the directors of the intelligence agencies to appear before the 
legislative bodies is a useful oversight tool, both at national and E.U. levels. On one hand, 
it provides the members of the parliament the opportunity to engage in public debates 
with the heads of the agencies, especially with regard to contested issues. On the other 
hand, it gives the directors a chance to inform the representatives on agencies’ activities, 
require additional resources, and changes to the legal framework. Also, it is a good 
opportunity for the general public to be informed about the agencies. The downside of 
this oversight tool is that during the engagement the directors cannot address classified 
issues; therefore, the discussions are limited to general ideas and activities. 
Currently, the European Parliament has limited powers to summon the 
directors of the intelligence agencies. While, article 48 of the Europol Decision states that 
the director of Europol is obliged to appear before the E.P. at its request,118 there is no 
similar legal provision with regard to the director of INTCEN. The E.P. has no power to 
summon INTCEN’s director, yet there is a certain level of engagement between the two. 
The head of INTCEN appears before the European Parliament and its Defense 
Subcommittee to discuss aspects of the agency’s work, on an ad hoc basis. Since 
INTCEN is part of the EEAS and falls under the authority of the High Representative,  
legal provisions require that the High Representative regularly consult with and inform 
the  Parliament with regard to foreign security related policies and  that it is responsible 
for  ensuring that the  E.P.’s guidance is implemented into subordinated bodies’ work.119 
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Although, the directors of Europol and INTCEN, along with the High 
Representative, engage with the European Parliament, there is still little interest for these 
events among the members of the European legislative body. A study of the E.U.’s 
Directorate-General for Internal Policies, published in 2011, points out that the members 
of the  E.P. did not properly scrutinize the documents sent by the intelligence agencies 
supposedly due to lack of time and interest in security related issues. Therefore, during 
public hearings held by the agencies’ directors, the parliamentary members could not ask 
pertinent questions about the agencies’ work.120 
b. Informal Meetings 
While the informal meetings between the intelligence agencies’ 
representatives and members of the E.P. do not necessarily constitute oversight, they 
have an important role in strengthening relations between the two. In the E.U., there is a 
lot of engagement at an informal level, especially between Europol and members of 
specialized committees of the E.P. The staffers of the intelligence agencies and the 
members of specialized oversight committees of the E.P. (Civil Liberties, Justice, and 
Home Affairs Committee LIBE and Foreign Affairs Committee AFET)121 regularly 
engage in informal meetings to share information about agencies’ activities. Also, the 
specialized committees send representatives to visit the agencies’ premises. In 2010, 
members of the LIBE committee visited Europol’s working facilities and received 
briefings on the agency’s agenda.122 Furthermore, the director of Europol regularly 
participates in conferences, meetings, and briefings, organized by the oversight bodies. 
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The INTCEN does not show the same enthusiasm in engaging in informal 
settings with the members of the European Parliament. The staffers of INTCEN do not 
participate in the events organized by the AFET committee. They are not required to do 
so, since these are informal meetings, but this absence prevents the members of the 
oversight bodies, and ultimately the EP from receiving valuable information on the 
agency’s activities. 
c. Budgetary Oversight 
According to the Treaty on Functioning of the E.U. (TFEU), the European 
Parliament is the budgetary authority for Europol and INTCEN, although the latter 
receives its budget through the EEAS, rather than directly from the E.P.123 Accordingly 
the E.P. is the body that provides budgetary oversight of Europol and EEAS. The 
European Parliament has no say in the member countries’ contributions to either Europol 
or INTCEN. As a result, these contributions would be better suited to national 
parliaments’ budgetary oversight. 
The EP has two committees, which provide the budget and budgetary 
oversight. The Committee on Budgets (BUDG)124 drafts the E.P.’s position regarding the 
E.U.’s annual budget. The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT)125 is responsible 
for the budgetary scrutiny of the E.U. agencies. As BUDG has the “power of the purse,” 
it has more power over E.U. agencies than does the Committee on Budgetary Control. In 
order to properly scrutinize the intelligence agencies, BUDG requires access to 
information. If the required information is not provided, BUDG can apply the “reserve 
procedure,” which means that it can block a part of an agency’s funds, until the issue is 
resolved. Budget has used the procedure in the past, as a means to access information. 
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This issue points to the lack of an appropriate legal framework to allow the European 
Parliament to obtain information about the intelligence agencies.126 
Another issue regarding budgetary oversight is related to the way the E.U. 
budget is structured, based on functional areas of expenditure (personnel, administrative, 
and operational), rather than linked to policies and agencies’ output. Therefore, it is very 
hard for BUDG to assign the budget according to policy priorities. Also, it is difficult for 
CONT to evaluate the efficiency of the intelligence agencies. 
d. Independent Specialized Bodies 
Europol is responsible for processing, storing, and transferring personal 
data. Given the sensitive character of working with personal data, the European 
Parliament created an independent specialized body to oversee Europol’s activities in this 
area. The Joint Supervising Body (JSB)127 consists of two representatives from each 
member state. Its main task is to ensure that Europol complies with the E.U. and national 
legal frameworks. With regard to personal data, JSB: 
• Provides input on any draft agreement that Europol intends to sign 
with third parties, to ensure personal data are protected, both by 
Europol and the third party 
• Reviews and monitors the cooperation agreements, once they have 
been signed 
• Serves as an appellate committee for E.U. citizens, who request 
access to personal data and consider that they received an 
unsatisfactory response from Europol.128 
Additionally, starting in 2010, JSB has monitored Europol’s activities in 
the Terrorist Financing Tracking Program (TFTP) Agreement between the E.U. and the 
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United States, known as the SWIFT agreement.129 Moreover, the Europol Council 
Decision requires that JSB provide reports to the E.P. and Council, on a regular basis. 
This is to ensure that Europol remains independent and transparent. These are all very 
important roles for the JSB in overseeing Europol, since the European Parliament is not 
involved in any of the above activities. 
In order to fulfill its tasks, JSB meets four times per year and conducts 
inspections to check Europol’s premises. Normally, JSB inspects Europol once every 
year, but additional inspections can be carried out when required by a particular situation. 
The JSB meetings are not public, since personal data are involved, but the body provides 
public reports. Its opinions are non-binding regarding personal data issues, but become 
binding when JSB acts as the appellate body. Failure to comply with JSB’s appellate 
decisions is considered a violation of E.U. legislation. 
So far, JSB has been very effective in scrutinizing Europol’s work. For 
example, after the E.U. signed the SWIFT agreement, JSB conducted two inspections of 
Europol’s premises, to oversee the implementation of the program. After each visit, JSB 
published reports with regard to the way Europol complied with E.U. legislation on the 
protection of personal data. The reports pointed out that Europol did not fully observe the 
E.U.’s legal framework when releasing personal data to U.S. agencies without properly 
reviewing them.130 Additionally, several members of the JSB publicly expressed their 
concerns about the safeguard of personal data by Europol. A debate in the European 
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Parliament was called for on this issue.131 As a result, the JSB formulated stricter 
recommendations for Europol. Although the JSB’s findings did not create legal 
obligations, Europol has demonstrated interest in implementing the recommendations. To 
prove its good intentions, Europol organized meetings and in- progress reviews with the 
members of the JSB to ensure that previous recommendations were taken into 
consideration.132 
While JSB’s reports are available to the E.P. and Council, there is little 
dialogue between the institutions. Many members of the E.P. are not aware of the 
existence and capabilities of the JSB. Therefore, even the members of the specialized 
oversight parliamentary committees do not engage in activities with the JSB. Better 
cooperation between these institutions will improve the oversight process since the 
purpose of the JSB and specialized E.P. committees is to protect citizens’ rights. 
Members of the E.P. can use JSB’s experience and develop relations with Europol to 
ensure that the agency’s activities are kept within the legal framework. Furthermore, JSB 
can provide the E.P. with important information regarding Europol’s work, and more 
importantly, its requirements to perform better. This would help strengthen Europol’s 
overall effectiveness. 
The E.P. does not have an independent specialized body to oversee 
INTCEN’s work. Since INTCEN does not store or process personal data, the E.P. did not 
see the requirement to assign an independent entity to scrutinize the agency’s activities. 
e. Specialized Parliamentary Committees 
The two main permanent parliamentary committees, which scrutinize and 
evaluate Europol and INTCEN’s work, are the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE) and Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET)  
The LIBE Committee is responsible for: 
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•  protection within the territory of the Union of citizens’ rights, 
human rights and fundamental rights, including the protection of 
minorities, as laid down in the Treaties and in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union; 
•  measures needed to combat all forms of discrimination other than 
those based on sex or those occurring at the workplace and in the 
labor market; 
• legislation in the areas of transparency and of the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data; 
•  establishment and development of an area of freedom, security 
and justice, in particular: measures concerning the entry and 
movement of persons, asylum and migration, integrated 
management of the common borders, and police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters; 
• the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Europol, 
Eurojust, European police College (Cepol) and other bodies and 
agencies in the same area; 
• determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State 
of the principles common to the Member States.133 
Europol falls under the LIBE Committee, since it is accountable to the 
Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. The committee is generally 
responsible for examining questions, provided by the members of the E.P., with regard to 
Europol’s work. To fulfill its tasks, with the approval of the E.P., LIBE can direct its 
members to conduct studies and fact-finding undertakings about certain areas of 
Europol’s activities. Also, the committee can organize hearings of Europol’s experts, 
when required to address a certain issue. If directed by the E.P. to address a particular 
aspect of Europol’s work, LIBE is responsible for drafting a detailed report for the E.P. 
Additionally, LIBE can take the initiative and prepare reports for the E.P. concerning the 
issues from its areas of responsibility. 
The committee is very active and effectively scrutinizes Europol’s work. 
Members of the committee regularly engage with Europol’s staffers, both on formal and 
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informal grounds. Also, they conduct visits to inspect Europol’s premises and discuss 
particular issues. Therefore, LIBE has a very important role in scrutinizing Europol’s 
work. It serves a twofold interest. On one hand, it provides the E.P. with information 
about Europol, to ensure the agency complies with the E.U.’s legal framework. On the 
other hand, it advertises Europol’s interests to the E.P. and facilitates legislative 
initiatives to increase Europol’s effectiveness. The LIBE generates reports about 
Europol’s role and European Internal Security Strategy, thus providing recommendations 
for the E.P. to strengthen the agency.134 Consequently, these reports provide important 
information for the E.U.’s decision makers, and serve as a provider of guidance for 
development of the E.U.’s security strategy. Additionally, LIBE’s reports regarding 
Europol’s work function as an evaluation of the agency’s effectiveness.135 
Technically, INTCEN falls under the scrutiny of the AFET Committee 
and its subcommittee on security and defense (SEDE), since they are responsible for the 
EEAS, within which INTCEN is positioned. 
The AFET Committee is responsible for: 
• common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the European 
security and defense policy (ESDP). In this context the committee 
is assisted by a subcommittee on security and defense (SEDE); 
• relations with other E.U. institutions and bodies, the UN and other 
international organizations and inter-parliamentary assemblies for 
matters falling under its responsibility; 
• strengthening of political relations with third countries, particularly 
those in the immediate vicinity of the Union, by means of major 
cooperation and assistance programs or international agreements 
such as association and partnership agreements; 
• opening, monitoring and concluding negotiations concerning the 
accession of European States to the Union; 
                                                 
134 EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), Report on the European 
Union’s Internal Security Strategy (Brussels: European Parliament, April 24, 2012), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bREPORT%2bA7–
2012–0143%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN. 
135 Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence 
Agencies in the European Union, 76. 
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• issues concerning human rights, the protection of minorities and 
the promotion of democratic values in third countries. In this 
context the committee is assisted by a subcommittee on human 
rights. Without prejudice to the relevant rules, members from other 
committees and bodies with responsibilities in this field shall be 
invited to attend the meetings of the subcommittee.136 
The general responsibilities of the AFET Committee are the same as 
LIBE’s. It can pursue questions addressed by the European Parliament, direct studies, 
organize hearings, and produce reports about INTCEN’s work. In practice, AFET and its 
SEDE subcommittee show little interest in scrutinizing INTCEN’s activities.137 This is 
due to EEAS and the High Representative’s attempts to maintain secrecy around 
INTCEN, and also the members of committees’ lack of interest in asking questions about 
the agency’s work. The E.P.’s study on parliamentary oversight of the security and 
intelligence agencies, published in 2011, points out that during the meetings between the 
AFET Committee and High Representative, often no document regarding INTCEN’s 
work has been provided. Therefore, the engagements seem to have been limited to oral 
briefings, with no substantial outcome, since no concrete information was provided. Also, 
the members of the committee refrained from asking sensitive questions about INTCEN, 
as they did not see this as important for the oversight process. Furthermore, the study 
emphasized that since the creation of the EEAS, in 2010, AFET and SEDE did not 
conduct any meetings with the service to scrutiny its activities.138 The AFET’s latest 
report contains only a short note on INTCEN, which refers to its reorganization,139 which 
was not new information, since it had already been publicized by the E.U. High 
Representative, Catherine Ashton, during a parliamentary questions session.140 The 
                                                 
136 European Parliament Rules of Procedure, Annex VII, Section I, 7th Parliamentary term (Brussels: 
European Parliament, 2012), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+RULES-EP+20121023+ANN-
07+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN&navigationBar=YES. 
137 Parliamentary Oversight of the Security and Intelligence Agencies in the European Union, 2011, 
67. 
138 Ibid., 71. 
139 EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on the implementation of the Common Security and 
Defense policy (Brussels: European Parliament, October 31, 2012), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bREPORT%2bA7–
2012–0357%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN. 
140 Parliamentary question, European Parliament, July 25, 2012. 
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AFET report does not contain any assessment or analysis of INTCEN’s role and work, 
nor does it advance recommendations for strengthening the agency. As a result, the 
specialized parliamentary committees do not provide effective oversight of INTCEN’s 
work. This prevents the E.P. from obtaining valuable information about the agency’s 
roles and capabilities which can result in a lack of understanding of how to properly 
employ INTCEN to enhance E.U. security. Correspondingly, INTCEN’s secrecy hurts 
the agency itself, since improving transparency would facilitate better support for its 
work by the E.U.’s decision makers. 
Although, INTCEN is part of EEAS, it also provides strategic assessment 
with regard to the terrorist threat within the E.U.; therefore, its work has implications for 
internal security, too. As a result, INTCEN becomes subject to oversight exercised by the 
LIBE committee. In practice, the LIBE committee does not scrutinize INTCEN, because 
of its work with the agencies which fall directly under its responsibility as well as the 
lack of access to information from INTCEN. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Democratic control of the intelligence agencies is required to ensure they do not 
abuse their powers and that they are able to perform their missions. Parliamentary 
oversight is the most democratic form of control, since it entails that the intelligence 
agencies remain accountable to the people, through their elected representatives. Given 
the complex architecture of the E.U. and the way Europol and INTCEN are staffed and 
resourced, parliamentary oversight of their activities is a shared responsibility of national 
legislatures and the European Parliament. However, member states’ parliaments are best 
placed to provide effective scrutiny of Europol and INTCEN since they second national 
representatives to these agencies, in accordance with their domestic laws. Yet, while 
some national constituencies are active in this field, the majority of member states lack 
the necessary interest, time, and knowledge to perform this task, focusing solely on 
overseeing their own national intelligence agencies. On the other hand, the E.P. has very 
powerful tools and mechanisms in place to oversee the intelligence agencies. The E.P. 
has the “power of the purse” and the ability to amend legislation regarding Europol and 
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INTCEN’s activities. Despite this, the E.P. seems to have a poor understanding of its role 
in the oversight process. The causes for this are the lack of interest, knowledge, and 
awareness of the members of the European Parliament about the capabilities and missions 
of the E.U. intelligence agencies. While Europol’s work is better understood and 
scrutinized, INTCEN remains a secret to the majority of the members of the E.P., even 
for the members of the AFET and SEDE committees, who have demonstrated little 
interest in overseeing INTCEN’s work. At the same time, the High Representative and 
EEAS have refrained from providing information about INTCEN. The secrecy 
surrounding the agency leads to a misunderstanding of its work, and has implications on 
both external and internal security of the E.U. 
To improve the current situation, the E.P. needs to become more involved in the 
oversight process. Furthermore, the shared responsibility with the national parliaments 
requires closer cooperation between the E.P. and member states’ legislative bodies to 
prevent a fractured oversight. The E.P. needs to step in and provide direction and assume 
responsibility for the intelligence agencies, especially INTCEN. In order to do so, the 
E.P. needs to receive assessments regarding the threats to the union and member states. 
Without these, the E.P. will not be able to develop effective counter measures. Moreover, 
the E.P. needs to address the challenges regarding the access to information, to increase 
Europol and INTCEN’s transparency and ensure they comply with the E.U.’s legal 
framework. The information will provide the E.P. with a better understanding of the 
needs of the intelligence agencies. As a result, the E.P. can amend the existing legislation, 
increase budgets, or set new cooperation agreements, to increase the intelligence 
agencies’ effectiveness. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis sought to examine whether the E.U.’s intelligence agencies can 
effectively deal with the challenges of the current complex security environment. It 
looked at Europol and INTCEN, as they provide the framework for intelligence 
cooperation among the E.U. member states. This study acknowledged that an assessment 
of intelligence effectiveness is a very difficult task and that there is no “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to the issue. As a result, it built on Thomas Bruneau and Cris Matei’s Civil-
Military relations’ trinity (control − effectiveness − efficiency)141 and advanced a 
conceptual framework for assessing effectiveness. Specifically, the thesis looked at 
Europol and INTCEN’s legal framework, cooperation, and democratic control to 
determine if they are capable of fulfilling their missions effectively, and at the same time, 
transparently. 
Chapter one presented the reasoning for this research and the relevance of the 
subject. As the E.U. currently consists of twenty-nine countries, more than 500 million 
people, and a quarter of the world’s defense budget, it is a major player on the 
international stage. Also, it maintains a form of cooperation between nation states as 
never seen before; more than an alliance, but short of a federal state. Therefore, this 
chapter argued that exploring the E.U. intelligence agencies’ effectiveness is not a 
marginal effort, but one which can provide valuable insights for the E.U. and other 
similar international forms of cooperation. Furthermore, the chapter provided a 
comprehensive description of the existing literature on intelligence, effectiveness, and 
E.U. agencies. It argued that while there are many studies dedicated to intelligence and 
effectiveness in general, there are fewer studies that assess the E.U.’s intelligence 
agencies’ effectiveness, and they lack an adequate conceptual framework Therefore, this 
                                                 
141 Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15:5 (Stanford: Institute for international 
Studies, 2008): 909−929. Also look at Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, Intelligence reform in 
new democracies: factors supporting or arresting progress, Democratization, 18: 3 (Stanford: Institute for 
international Studies, 2011), 602–630. 
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thesis attempted to complement the existing literature on E.U. intelligence agencies, 
providing a framework which could be used for further endeavors to examine the topic. 
Chapter two provided a short description of Europol and INTCEN’s evolution to 
provide a better understanding of the subsequent analysis of their effectiveness. It looked 
at the agencies’ histories, mandates, staffing, and resources in an attempt to identify 
whether these factors allow the agencies to fulfill their assigned tasks. The chapter found 
that Europol provides the institutional framework for law enforcement and intelligence 
cooperation among E.U. members to combat any form of serious offenses, including 
organized crime and terrorism. The INTCEN is the E.U.’s crisis center and provides 
assessment of the terrorist threat to both internal and external security. In this context, 
this chapter argued that both agencies are key players in the E.U.’s efforts to design 
security policies and that the study of their effectiveness is an important endeavor. The 
main findings are that both agencies evolved from informal and relatively small forums 
of cooperation between member states into complex and developed institutions. Their 
growth reflected the overall changes in the E.U. architecture and also the challenges of 
the current security environment. Europol is now a fully-fledged E.U. agency, with its 
own budget provided by the union and its role in the E.U.’s internal security is increasing. 
It employs analysts and E.U. staff, along with national representatives who act as liaison 
officers between member countries and Europol. The INTCEN transformed from a “calm 
newsroom with television-sets running CNN and computers linked to major news 
agencies,”142 to an agency which delivers assessments reports that are the basis for the 
E.U.’s counterterrorism policies. Yet, INTCEN does not have a formal mandate, or at 
least, there is no founding document publicly available. This has implications on the 
agency’s transparency and affects the way it is understood by E.U. decision makers. 
Furthermore, INTCEN consists of seconded national representatives. It does not have its 
own budget since the funding comes through the EEAS. 
Chapter three reviewed the existing legal framework of the two agencies with 
regard to intelligence cooperation, and more specifically, Europol and INTCEN’s 
                                                 
142 Jelle van Buuren, Secret Truth, The EU Joint Situation Centre, 10. 
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mandates. It found that despite the fact that INTCEN does not have a publicly available 
mandate, its missions and competences derived from the declarations of high E.U. 
officials, such as the E.U. HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policies and agency’s 
former or current directors. The chapter looked at the general legal framework, 
attempting to identify how the E.U.’s intelligence system works. It emphasized the role 
and powers of the member states in the functioning of the E.U. intelligence agencies. 
Since, running the E.U. is a common endeavor for the European Parliament and member 
states, this chapter found that sovereign states still have a strong say in the design of the 
union’s legal framework, while maintaining their sovereign legal systems and 
cooperation procedures. In the absence of clear guidance from the E.U., the member 
states pursue their individual goals and interpret the legal provisions according to their 
national specific situations. This results in a lack of unity of effort at the E.U. level and 
affects the effectiveness of the E.U. intelligence agencies, as they are the expression of 
member states’ cooperation. Furthermore, the chapter attempted to identify Europol and 
INTCEN’s powers and competences. Because of emphasis on sovereign states, the E.U. 
institutions have limited powers to operate across the E.U. territory. They rely solely on 
member states, and have no powers to enforce cooperation. Also, the chapter emphasized 
that Europol and INTCEN have overlapping responsibilities, especially in the field of 
counterterrorism, which can cause intelligence gaps. These gaps are usually filled by the 
national intelligence agencies, but in the absence of a coordinating body at the E.U. level, 
they might be missed by both E.U. and national agencies, which can lead to increased 
risk to E.U. security. 
Chapter four looked at the level of cooperation between the member states under 
the umbrella of the E.U. agencies. Specifically, it attempted to identify the challenges for 
increased cooperation. The chapter found that while cooperation between the member 
states exists, it is often done outside the E.U. legal framework and institutions, through 
multilateral agreements. States prefer to maintain their prior cooperation agreements, 
rather than entering new ones, under the E.U. framework. Since, exchanging intelligence 
requires a certain level of trust and mutual interest, which usually take time to develop, 
member states favor established regional and informal cooperation initiatives. The E.U.’s 
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calls for increased cooperation are challenged by additional factors, such as: lack of a 
common sense of threat, a coordinating E.U. body and capabilities. Furthermore, 
bureaucratic resistance and improper balance between costs and benefits for member 
states are factors which prevent effective intelligence cooperation. 
Chapter five dealt with transparency and attempted to identify to whom and in 
what degree Europol and INTCEN are democratically accountable. It looked at the 
oversight and control provided by the European Parliament and member states’ 
legislative bodies. The chapter argued that transparency is an important factor in 
improving effectiveness, for two reasons. First, it keeps the agencies accountable to the 
people, through their elected representatives, and ensures they comply with the existing 
legal framework. Second, transparency helps the agencies, too, by ensuring they are 
properly understood and known by the decision makers; therefore, they receive 
appropriate support and guidance to fulfill their assigned missions. The chapter addressed 
the way democratic control is exercised by specialized parliamentary committees, and 
independent bodies, which have a wide array of tools available to perform effective 
oversight and control of Europol and INTCEN. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Considering the preceding discussion, the author can conclude that Europol and 
INTCEN provided the member states with an institutional framework for intelligence 
cooperation and strengthened the E.U.’s internal and external security. Yet, the two 
institutions demonstrate certain infirmities, some by design and some by practice, which 
limit their effectiveness. 
For one thing, the E.U. legal framework presents flaws and allows the member 
states to implement directives and policies according to their national laws. The E.U.’s 
central institutions do not provide enough guidance for the member states. This lack 
causes different interpretations across the E.U. for the same legal provisions. Moreover, 
the process of implementing an E.U. directive is lengthy, since it has to be ratified by the 
separate national constituencies, before it becomes an E.U. law. Given the differences 
between member states, some directives may take years before they enter into force. This 
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is highly problematic, especially in the area of security, where dealing with the complex 
threat environment requires immediate action. Also, the current legal framework allows 
member states the possibility to not ratify a directive, but still remain part of the union. 
As a result, the E.U. directives apply only in the countries which endorsed them. This 
deters the implementation of a unified approach at the European level, especially in the 
areas of law enforcement and intelligence, where effective cooperation requires 
harmonized procedures. It is worth noting that intelligence cooperation involves the 
exchange of personal data and sensitive information, and the current E.U. legal 
framework does not have a standardized agreement on personal data protection, but 
separate ones for every agreement member states signed. This leads to confusion on how 
to protect this information and allows member states to refrain from sharing intelligence 
if it is thought the information is not properly protected. It is also true that in the area of 
security, member states do not have the same leeway as in other areas, but still the current 
emphasis remains on member states’ sovereignty and freedom to pursue their own 
interests, which weakens the E.U.’s institutions. Since, Europol and INTCEN depend a 
great deal on national agencies to provide intelligence, they suffer from the general E.U. 
lack of unity. This, by far, is their biggest weakness. As their mandates grant them no 
operational powers, Europol and INTCEN are cooperation forums, rather than effective 
E.U. agencies. Both organizations fall short of playing a much needed coordinating role 
at the E.U. level. The Europol and INTCEN do not have their own intelligence collection 
means which makes them rely on member states’ capabilities. This limits their 
effectiveness, because member states consider that the E.U. agencies cannot produce 
better assessments than the ones put out by the national intelligence bodies. In case of any 
intelligence failure, the national institutions are expected to be held accountable to the 
decision makers and public opinion, rather than the E.U. agencies. Therefore, member 
states still need to be convinced of the added value of the E.U. intelligence bodies. 
Additionally, the E.U. agencies’ mandates give them no power to enforce cooperation. 
Since member states have total freedom to determine when, how, and with whom to 
cooperate, Europol and INTCEN play only a support role in European intelligence 
cooperation. They can act only upon invitation from member states which limits their 
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ability to enforce a unified strategy across the E.U. Furthermore, the current mandates 
allow for overlapping competences between Europol and INTCEN in the area of 
counterterrorism. This situation might create confusion and allow for intelligence gaps to 
occur, since neither of them plays the coordinating role in this area. Finally, the E.U.’s 
complicated bureaucracy decreases Europol and INTCEN’s effectiveness. The annual 
requirement to develop complex reports leads to the agencies “checking the block,” 
rather than producing effective studies. The INTCEN is simply too small to be able to 
effectively cover the terrorist threats to both internal and external security of the E.U. 
Additionally, the lack of interest from the E.U. decision makers and national legislatives 
for the E.U. agencies can result in dangerous outcomes for the E.U.’s internal and 
external security. 
On the other hand, in the current context, the differences in the development of 
political and economic infrastructure among member states will most likely continue to 
influence the way they participate in the E.U. agencies. The E.U. needs to develop legal 
incentives for increased cooperation and provide specific guidance for the member states 
on how to implement specific policies and directives. Legal procedures need to be 
harmonized across the E.U., to allow for better and more effective cooperation. The 
adoption of the European Common Arrest Warrant and strengthening the European Court 
of Justice and European Court for Human Rights are important steps ahead, but not 
sufficient. The E.U. has to continue to constantly push member states to improve 
cooperation. Moreover, the legal provisions with regard to sensitive information and 
personal data protection need to be standardized, to facilitate a more effective exchange 
between member states and the E.U. institutions. To be able to enforce cooperation, the 
E.U. agencies require changes in the legal framework to give them, rather than the 
national bodies, the right to determine the “need to know” basis for intelligence 
cooperation., This requires that E.U. institutions assume responsibility for the outcomes 
of intelligence cooperation, a situation which is less likely to happen if the emphasis 
remains on member states’ sovereignty. It seems that intelligence can follow the 
economic and financial sectors’ examples, where the European Central Bank increased its 
role and tightened control over member states. Additionally, the E.U. must establish clear 
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and simple reporting channels for the intelligence agencies, to eliminate the existing 
complicated bureaucracy. Also, it should avoid maintaining annual requirements for 
complex reports such as OCTA and TESAT. Rather, it has to stimulate constant 
interaction between the decision makers and the agencies to allow for better information 
exchange and provide the feedback the agencies need to effectively perform their 
missions. This can be accomplished either by allowing Europol and INTCEN to focus on 
particular aspects of terrorism and organized crime each year, rather than struggling to 
cover all, or having Europol work on organized crime and INTCEN on counterterrorism, 
establishing them as the single points of contact at the E.U. level in these respective 
areas. In this context, INTCEN needs to be strengthened, in order to be able to effectively 
perform its tasks. Addressing these issues will improve the current situation and generate 
better security strategies and policies for the E.U. 
On the same note, looking in depth at intelligence cooperation, this thesis finds 
that the current level is lower than E.U. ambitions. The frequent calls for increased 
cooperation put forward by politicians do not meet the same enthusiasm at the E.U. 
intelligence agencies’ level. Effective intelligence cooperation is hard to achieve even at 
the national level as different agencies compete for resources and attention from the 
decision makers. The lack of a defined common E.U. interest allows for competing 
national agendas rather than a unified European approach. Equally important is the fact 
that there are important variations across the E.U. regarding the perceived level and 
nature of threats. This determines that member states which feel less threatened consider 
intelligence cooperation a low priority and focus more on economic issues instead. In this 
context, it is hard for the E.U. agencies to project a sense of urgency among member 
states, with regard to intelligence cooperation. Unfortunately, the 2011 terrorist attacks in 
Norway and in 2012 in Bulgaria demonstrated that no country is safe from the current 
environment’s threats, regardless of its size or nature of foreign policy. Hopefully, these 
tragic incidents served as wake-up calls for the European countries and convinced them 
that combating current challenges requires effective intelligence and effective 
intelligence cooperation and sharing. Additionally, the process is challenged by the 
complex E.U. bureaucracy, which allows for turf wars between the agencies. The 
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differences in the organizational cultures of Europol and INTCEN deter effective 
cooperation, especially in the area of counterterrorism, where they share common 
responsibilities. 
Finally, probably the most important challenge for the E.U.’s intelligence 
cooperation is the lack of trust among member states. Since the union expanded in 
several waves, it is hard for the new members to achieve the same level of trust older 
ones have. In this context, it is likely that the states will maintain existing cooperation 
agreements with trusted counterparts and enter new ones, only if they benefit from them. 
Developing trust takes time and constant cooperation between member states under the 
E.U.’s institutional framework, because the more the states cooperate, the more they will 
trust each other. Under these circumstances, the E.U. needs to develop incentives to 
stimulate member countries to enter cooperation agreements, within the E.U.’s 
institutions. Addressing the complex challenges discussed in this thesis requires a 
comprehensive approach, since they are interrelated and cannot be treated in isolation. 
This should involve a common effort of the E.U.’s institutions and member states. 
While the description of legal framework and cooperation dealt with 
effectiveness, that of democratic control addressed transparency of the E.U. agencies. 
Although, there is a constant fight for finding the proper balance between effectiveness 
and transparency of the intelligence agencies, this thesis argued that transparency goes 
hand in hand with effectiveness. The reason behind this is that while having the agencies 
transparent ensures that they are accountable to the people through their elected officials, 
it also provides for the decision makers gaining important information regarding the 
agencies’ needs to perform their tasks. This helps decision makers understand the work 
and provide the required legal and financial support for the intelligence agencies and will 
increase their effectiveness. Therefore, increasing transparency should be a goal for both 
the decision makers and intelligence agencies. Democratic control of the intelligence 
agencies is required to ensure they do not abuse their powers and are able to perform their 
missions. Parliamentary oversight is the most democratic form of control, since it entails 
the intelligence agencies remaining accountable to the people, through their elected 
representatives. Given the E.U.’s legal framework and the way Europol and INTCEN are 
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staffed and resourced, parliamentary oversight of their activities is a shared responsibility 
of the national legislatures and the European Parliament. Member states’ parliaments are 
best placed to provide effective scrutiny of Europol and INTCEN, since they second 
national representatives to these agencies, in accordance with their domestic laws. While 
some national constituencies are active in this field, the majority of member states lack 
the necessary interest, time, and knowledge to perform this task, focusing solely on 
overseeing their own national intelligence agencies. On the other hand, the EP has very 
powerful tools and mechanisms in place to oversee the intelligence agencies. The EP has 
the “power of the purse” and to amend the legislation regarding Europol and INTCEN’s 
activities. Even so, the EP seems to have a poor understanding of its role in the oversight 
process. The causes for this are the lack of interest, knowledge, and awareness of the 
members of parliament, about the capabilities and missions of the E.U. intelligence 
agencies. While Europol’s work is better understood and scrutinized, INTCEN remains a 
secret for the majority of the members of the EP, even for the members of the AFET and 
SEDE committees, who have demonstrated little interest in overseeing INTCEN’s work. 
At the same time, the High Representative and EEAS refrained from providing 
information about INTCEN. The fact that the agency does not have a publicly available 
mandate adds to the confusion and misunderstanding of its missions. The secrecy 
surrounding INTCEN hurts the agency and causes a lack of adequate support from the 
member states and E.U. decision makers. 
To improve the current situation, the EP needs to become more involved in the 
oversight process. Furthermore, the shared responsibility with the national parliaments 
requires closer cooperation between EP and member states’ legislative bodies, to prevent 
a fractured oversight. The EP needs to step in and provide direction and assume 
responsibility for the intelligence agencies, especially INTCEN. In order to do so, the EP 
needs to receive assessments regarding the threats to the union and member states. 
Without these, the EP will not be able to develop effective counter measures. Moreover, 
the EP needs to address the challenges regarding the access to information, by devising a 
system to increase the number of security cleared members of parliament, thus allowing 
them access to Europol and INTCEN’s classified documents. This will increase Europol 
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and INTCEN’s transparency and, therefore, awareness of the EP about the agencies. The 
information will provide the EP with a better understanding of the needs of the 
intelligence agencies. As a result, the EP can amend the existing legislation, increase 
budgets, or set new cooperation agreements, to increase the intelligence agencies’ 
effectiveness. 
To conclude, this thesis’ main finding is that Europol and INTCEN represent 
forms of cooperation between nation states, at a level never seen before.143 Despite this, 
there is still much room to increase their value. Addressing the flaws of the legal 
framework, developing incentives for states to strengthen cooperation, and enhancing the 
democratic control of Europol and INTCEN are key steps which the European Union can 
take to improve their effectiveness. 
                                                 
143 Bjorn Fagersten argues in Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation: A Theoretical Framework 
(Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2012) that the cooperation within the EU 
institutions, especially in the area of Common Foreign Policy and Security is higher than within NATO and 
UN. In the table used at page 5, he points out that the EU states have more interaction within the 
intelligence agencies and complete more tasks, than the members of NATO and UN. 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Fagersten%20theoretical%20framework.pdf. 
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